

# **Societal security**

## **An agenda for the Eastern Europe**

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### **1. Approaches to the concept of security. The new post-modern approach**

In the original way of addressing the security, the content of the concept was relatively simple: **Security is the condition or stage of an entity**(in particular a political entity, **a polity**) **is sure about its survival**<sup>1</sup>. As we can see, security and survival has had different means at different moments in time for different countries. Moreover, security was not consider to be an essential problem of states for along period of time, instead the problems of **power** and **peace** where considered to be in the forefront. Security was considered a part of the power debate. In this respect, it was considered an underdeveloped concept<sup>2</sup>.

After the Cold War, security came back as **a concept of first importance** especially because of its position situated between power and peace. But the “golden age” was related to the **realism**, so the moment where the only international actors were the states, where security was the study of the threats, the use and the control of the military power<sup>3</sup>. In this approach, security was not a concept in itself, a condition, a status, an attribute, but more of a study of the factors and decisions that could lead to a situation<sup>4</sup>. Walt study<sup>5</sup> was focus to define the need of security studies, in the sense of the **political goal**, as well as the ways and means for making this studies ahead, the **methodological goal**.

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<sup>1</sup> Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean, The Politics of National Security. Concepts, institutions, processes, Polirom, Iași, 2007, pp.77-99

<sup>2</sup> Barry Buzan, People States and Fear, 1991

<sup>3</sup> Stephen Walt, The Renaissance of the Security Studies, International Studies Quaterly, vol.XXXV, nr.2, pp.211-239

<sup>4</sup> Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean, The Politics of National Security. Concepts, institutions, processes, Polirom, Iași, 2007, p.80

<sup>5</sup> Stephen Walt, The Renaissance of the Security Studies, International Studies Quaterly, vol.XXXV, nr.2, pp.211-239

In the **first stage** of the security studies (Second World War-1970), the target was exclusively the military establishment, **the equilibrium of nuclear weapons** and the difficulties between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the **second stage** of the studies, after the Vietnam war(1970-1989), security was no longer linked only to the state and to its military capacities, but also to political entities, their economy, internal politics, strategic resources (oil, gas and water) and population. After the Cold War, the **concept was reframed** so that security was **extended and deepened**. This theoretical idea was the result of the needs of the security after the fall of the bipolar world, a post modern approach where the EU, NATO and **international politics** played a more important role as well as other types of actors, sub-state and non-state ones.

**Neo-liberalism** has introduced through Lord, Keohane, Wallander and Haftendorn the argument of the **economic resources**, introducing the first elements of the economic security. They also focus on the costs and benefits of the conflicts and introduce the **added value of the international institutions** in solving the conflicts and avoiding some security threats, the model being UN, OSCE but also NATO<sup>6</sup>. Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhman introduced the concept of **risk society**, where the risk is a system for **managing the hazards and insecurities** that appeared in the context of modernization of the society<sup>7</sup>.

But the most ambitious was the reform of the security agenda made by Barry Buzan, Ole Waver and their Copenhagen School<sup>8</sup> (also call the European School of Security), by introducing the societal element in the study of security, linked with the concepts of **weak and strong state**, as well as introducing the **five aspects of security** – military, political, economic, societal and ecological. The basic assumptions came from the British school of International relations which did introduce the idea of **International society**, with the responsibility of states for the development and future of this type of society.

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<sup>6</sup> Helga Haftendorn, Celeste Wallender, Robert O. Keohane, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 1999

<sup>7</sup> Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London, 1992

<sup>8</sup> Barry Buzan, People States and Fear, 1991, Weaver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. and Lemaitre, P. (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter. p.23;

## 2. Societal security – concept, content, issues.

“**Societal security**” is the umbrella term for efforts to cope with modern security threats to society. The concept of ‘societal security’ has been formulated to account for the phenomenon of societal identity and cohesion as sources of instability.

### **Societal security**

The most influential idea to emerge from the conceptual widening of the Security Studies in the 90’s by the Copenhagen School was that of the **societal security**. The concept is leading basically to non-military threats with non-military solutions when **the subject** is not **the state**(national security), neither **the individuals in it** (human security, safety), but **the society**<sup>9</sup>. The Copenhagen School did a service to the concept of security by releasing the discipline related to this – security studies, strategic studies, international relations, conflict analysis – from the **state-centric straitjacket**. By this step, consideration was made to **political killing** of people by their own government or other sections of the society, as well as offering an explanation to the death of individuals due to social construction, however abstract and subjective they may be<sup>10</sup>.

“Societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats”<sup>11</sup>. This security is threatened when “societies perceive a threat in identity terms”<sup>12</sup>.

“Societal security is the new dimension that is being constructed. It is meant to bridge the gap between state security and human safety.”<sup>13</sup>

The term **societal security** was first used by Barry Buzan in the book “People, States and Fear”<sup>14</sup> (Buzan: 1991). Societal security was just one of

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<sup>9</sup> Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security, Routledge, London and New York, 2004

<sup>10</sup> Idem, pp. 106-123

<sup>11</sup> Weaver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. and Lemaitre, P. (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter. p.23

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem

<sup>13</sup> Swedish Emergency Management Agency Societal Security and Crisis Management in the 21st Century Stockholm, Sweden, 2004, p19

<sup>14</sup> Barry Buzan, People States and Fear, 1991

the five sectors in his five-dimensional approach to security theory, along with military, political, economic, and environmental security. Here, however, all of Buzan's dimensions, including the societal one, were still sectors of state security: Society, for example, was just one sector where the state could be threatened.

In "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe"<sup>15</sup> however, Ole Waever argues that Buzan's previous five-dimensional approach had become 'untenable' as a present context for societal security. As a result, he proposed a reconceptualisation of Buzan's previous theory; not of five sectors of state security, but of a duality of state and societal security. **Societal security** is still kept as a sector of state security, but now it is also a **referent object of security** in its own right. Whereas **state security is concerned about threats to its sovereignty** (if the state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state), **societal security is concerned about threats to a society's identity** (if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society)<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, although the state is still a referent object for the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors, 'society' is also a referent object for the **societal sector**.

By definition, **societies** are groups united by a sense of collective identity. Practically, they occur when the term "we" is used. In studying security aspects, societies are different from other structures (i.e. states, international organizations) or from individuals. They may operate and interact within the international system as units, they have a history / a common past and they have a common future.

In this context, societies may include nation-states, but this is not always true, as well as it is not true to limit a society to a singular element of definition regarding a group's identity: ethnic, religious, gender, age, etc. Therefore, applying the concept of security to this definition of society, **societal security** is dealing mainly with the preservation and affirmation of the **society's identity and cohesion of society's members**, considering all descriptive elements of the given society analyzed. By occurrence, the most used elements to be maintained are ethno-cultural and religious identities.

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<sup>15</sup> Weaver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. and Lemaitre, P. (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter. p.23

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem

Therefore, to define threats to societal security is difficult, framework under which changes (natural or external / man made) to the society may be seen as **threats toward changing the group identity**, including group's homogeneity and cohesion and will be seen as natural responses to the shifting historical circumstances. Societal identity may be threaten from a large scale of factors, from suppression of its own expression trough to interference / or inability to reproduce itself across generations.

Examples of societal threats may include:

- **cultural cleansing** - systemic approach toward destruction or limitation of institutions and / or cultural symbols important for the group's identity;
- **ethnic cleansing** – deliberate, voluntary harassment, violence, killing, and/ or deportation of members of one society against other society.

Therefore, in those two examples, often, the majority, or the most powerful group or the nation – state, take advantage of the weakest groups/ groups.

Analytically, societal security is dealing with threats to identity and to cohesion of a society, framework under which these threats can be exemplified like in the table:

#### **Identity**

Minorities rights  
Extremism / nationalism  
Cultural identity  
Religious identity  
Historical background  
Language

#### **Cohesion**

Demographic patterns changes  
Separatism  
Regionalism  
Anarchy  
Poverty/ economic status  
Migration  
Family and household patterns

In simpler terms, societal security is dealing with the perception of threats and the society's reaction to the real or perceived threats to its identity and cohesion. Both types of threats could be real or only perceived ones, but as long as they generate a reaction or contra-reaction are part of **the proxy - determinants** in analyzing the societal security. In the same manner, determinants of societal security could be **internal** (intra-societal factors) or **external** (bilateral, multinational, sub national or regional factors).

### 3. Societal security threats

As we have seen before, **Ethnic conflicts** inside states, **minorities rights**, are threats to societal security, besides the content of hard security and threats to the state. The issue of **immigration** in many Western European countries in the 90's could be constructed as a threat to societal security. The threats to **traditional values and customs** could also be a threat to the society.

Revival of radical **regionalism, separatism**, are threats to societal security, specially in terms of **societal cohesion**. **Anti-Western nationalism** and **rhetoric, anti-Christian** vocal statements and actions in some Islamic groups and religious communities are also threats to societal cohesion.

**Societal security** threats are the ones that are altering and threaten also the **individual existential security**. Issues like abandoning the state currency in favor of monetary union with the neighbor countries or cultural dominance of foreign films are not threats to societal security as such, since they are not existence threats to the way of life of individuals in this society and in the state.

**Vertical competition** occurs from integration into a wider cultural definition, or disintegration into smaller cultural units. This process can be seen at play in the current expansion of the European Union with a number of societies expressing fear of integration into a larger European identity. Some of these societies have responded by rejecting the adoption of the European currency and of ceding power to European political institutions.

The source of societal insecurity that has received the greatest attention has been **migration**. Migration threatens the identity of a society by causing a shift in the composition of society. The large-scale inflow of migrants of different societal backgrounds may ultimately lead to that culture becoming dominant.

Lastly, Buzan notes that **depopulation** may be another source of insecurity for societies, either from conflict or ethnic cleansing, disease or to a decline in natural population growth.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen school has employed societal security to explain the reaction of European 'societies' against the migration policies of

the state and against the widening and deepening of EU integration. The problem is that in such cases, ‘societies’ closely mirror the state in which they are found, thus obfuscating the distinction between societal actors and state actors. Applying the concept to non-state ‘societies’ will not only test the usefulness of the concept, it should also help elucidate the process by which ‘societies’ act, which remains unclear due to the fact that ‘societies’ unlike states, lack a clear definable securitizing actor.

**Applying societal security does provide analytical leverage when assessing what developments may be constructed as threatening and potentially cause violent conflict.** Using societal security makes it possible to explain how migration, television and radio broadcasts, election outcomes, and language education could contribute to violent conflict between societies, or between the state and a society.

According to Waever, in the international system societal security concerns: the ability of a society to persist under changing conditions and possible and actual threats. More specifically, it is about the **sustainability**, within acceptable conditions for evolution, **of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom**<sup>17</sup>.

Considering the current international arena and global security concerns, societal security should include elements of long term **mutual trust, predictability** and shared interests, along with a adjusted and adequate **public diplomacy tools**.

### **Discrimination as a form of threat to societal identity**

As a difference of the 19-th Century concept of the nation-state and Woodrow Wilson’s principles, today’s realities and the values of the actual society, post-industrial and post-modern, are referring more and more to human rights observance, to diversity and **the politics** created by the **observance of common rules, norms and behaviors**.

The society is **enriched by the diversity** created by its minorities, by the coexistence and respect to each other religion and customs, since there is a **clear principle of cohesion** of the society, coming more from values than

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<sup>17</sup> Ibidem

from identity in the strict sense of ethnicity or national exclusive principle of cohesion.

That's why **any form of discrimination** - even as an old type of reaction to enforce identity and a bad representation that this step could offer a strong cohesion principle - by the state of a majority of any kind, is a ground for **direct threat to societal security** and even a first step to a violent conflict and a threat to the national security in itself.

That's why the list of threats to societal security has in the forefront the following **types of discrimination**:

- a. national and ethnical identity
- b. religion
- c. gender
- d. disability
- e. other types of direct discrimination for the characteristic of a group
- f. politicide - killing for the political beliefs<sup>18</sup>.

Another type of threats to societal security could be made especially by the extreme interpretation of the **politics of human rights**, when the side effects of the application of such politics are **positive discrimination**, creating privilege groups by means of their possible discrimination, or indirect discrimination of the majority of the population of one state<sup>19</sup>. All those are **altering the societal cohesion** and are not helping to the principle of creating a third generation identity, a cultural nation, but are accentuating the **segregation of minority groups**. When the **collective rights** are passing over the cultural autonomy, moving to political, administrative or territorial autonomy, without concrete grounds to support such an **intermediary alternative administration** based on minority principles between the state and the local administration or individuals, there is a clear ground for threat to societal security and even a first step to threat to national security.

**Abuse of the concept** as well as **inconsistency in the application of the rules** linked with the human rights are as dangerous as any other type of

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<sup>18</sup> Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, p.105

<sup>19</sup> Idem, p.119



discrimination (being a discrimination towards the majority) and a clear threat to societal security<sup>20</sup>.

The solution is **empowering the individual international human rights laws**, as a **core values** for democratic behavior and a **guarantee for the societal cohesion**, since they are offering the **guarantees for the minorities** that their rights will be observed by the state and the others and are **eliminating the grounds for claims of segregation, separatism** or other extreme forms of collective rights, in terms of territorial separatism and political/ethnic segregation.

**Globalization** and **integration** are objective processes and, in themselves, they are not a source of threats to societal security, but more of “**environmental natural changes**” for our societies. This doesn’t mean that those processes do not create evolutions that are source of threats to societal security as secondary effects of those processes<sup>21</sup> does not represent matters of life and death or fundamental threats to the **cohesion of the society**, even though they are evident source of discontinuity. The difference between **discontinuity** in cultural matters and the moment when this becomes threat to **societal cohesion and security** is more than a nuance or an issue of dimension, but it is more an issue of a **qualitative approach** and **real and touchable proofs of the fundamental spirit** created in the society, with an output in the dimensions of the cohesion of the society in question. This difference has been made by Mc. Sweeney: “societies, by definition, evolve and individual identities change with them, and this simple process doesn’t mean a **challenge to identity problematic** or to societal cohesion”<sup>22</sup>.

On the other hand, **threat to societal security** could be made also by the “**vocal arbiters of the threats to societal identity**”, like Radovan Karadzic, who arrived at the idea of “ethnically pure territory” solution. It is the same idea that comes from the side effects to security (societal security in our case) given by the **security dilemma** (threat given by the actions to increase security/societal security by the neighbor countries) or those given by a **false perception/exaggerated perception** of the threats in the conditions of the security dilemma.

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<sup>20</sup> Idem, p. 119

<sup>21</sup> Idem, p.106

<sup>22</sup> McSweeney, B. (1996) Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, Review of International Studies 22(1): 88-93

## **Diversity, multiculturalism and societal cohesion**

**Diversity** is an unanimously accepted value of the modern societies, where the contribution of the particularities of the national minorities, of the culture, art, traditional knowledge, brings an additional value to the titular national of a state. The international law managed even to quantify and legislate the special rights of the minorities and the ways of protecting the diversity and multiculturalism, without affecting the societal cohesion and the identity of a population of a state internationally recognized.

Within this context, we have introduced the two concepts that we use during the entire paper: multiculturalism and societal cohesion.

**Multiculturalism** is the **harmonious coexistence** of several cultures tolerating themselves, **mutually inter-helping themselves to promote new values** and use the diversity as a value **enriching the society** and determining the respect towards one another, within the day by day relations.

**The societal cohesion** is the other face of reality and existence of the communities and represents the sum of **values, norms, actions, behaviors determining the confluence, coexistence and unity vector** of society<sup>23</sup>.

None of the two concepts are, practically and in the day by day life, indissolubly connected to the contemporary societies, they are features acquired in time, based on the experience of coexistence, cooperation and collaboration of the elements of a community, the result of the contemporary civilization and of the **aware acceptance** by everybody, of the **general coexistence rules** and of the **other's liberties**. They are the results in time through **actions and policies of cohesion** and in the same time, **of defense of the rights and values of the multicultural diversity** of the society's composition.

### **The philosophy of differences, of the enemy and the cohesion principle**

There is a big difference of approach between the **philosophy of differences** revealed before – accepting the **added value** and the enrichment of the society by the very existence of the minorities or other ethnical well

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<sup>23</sup> Iulian Chifu, Bosnia –Herzegovina: Societal cohesion, the scene of the national reconstruction and the road towards European integration, Europa XXI nr.6, 2008, pp. 17-22

represented parts and, on the opposite, the philosophy of the enemy, where every ethnical different person in identify as an enemy or at least a kind of competitor, where the ethnicity is playing the leading role in the society.

Coming back to the comparative study of US Institute for Peace – “minorities at risk”, it outlines that the **increase of the activism and of the claims of the minorities are directly proportional with the decrease of the democratic indicators**, fact that implicitly leads to the dramatic increase of the discrimination degree and to the increase of the probability and risks regarding conflicts. Thus, the study divides the states in four big categories, old democracies, new democracies, countries in transition and autocracies.

The lack of access to the political decision, the centralization or re-centralization of the state power, the inequality of chances and inequality of the access to opportunities, directing of the opportunities on political criteria – in the administrative, economic fields of the professional promotion – are just as enough reasons to crate/maintain/escalate within the inter-ethnic conflicts. The indicators to be observed are the **indicators of the stage of democracy, the increase of the division degree of society and the directing towards a pattern with a guided democracy, trends of autocratic formula, the appearance of the rule of law, indoctrinating and politicizing of the society through the adoption of a “state doctrine”, specially an ethnic one**<sup>24</sup>.

#### **4. Societal security and the identity building process**

Two types of threats to the societal security – the threat to the **identity** and the threat to the **societal cohesion** – can be adequately investigated and, possibly, controlled if we are trying an analysis of the **identity building process** – a process connected to objective processes not to artificial ones, which means taking into account the **integrative processes** and **globalisation** and not the **artificial creation** and **formation of “invented identities”**, build on the laboratories of **propaganda** and **historical sectarianism**, not in the natural process of development of a society – and taking into account certain peculiarities of the regions dealt with in this policy paper.

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<sup>24</sup> Iulian Chifu, Identity and Multiculturalism, Diversity and Societal Cohesion, in *From Misunderstanding towards openness and collaboration in multicultural societies*, Pontos, Chisinau, 2005, pp. 230-245

The theoretical approaches linking the societal security and the identity equally focus on the notion of **cohesion**, meaning that security should be organic and should not compromise what it tries to save: “security should protect that which is **existential** (...), societal security being about those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group<sup>25</sup>”. The problems of collective identity are extremely complex both if approached from the point of view of the patterns used in building a **new European identity** in the EU-27 context or having in view the specific nature of the identity building in the Union’s Eastern neighbourhood, in the post-Soviet states. The perception of alterity in the areas characterized by cultural, ethnical, religious diversity or relating to distinct values, essentially involve a conflict-generating potential that can be mitigated or controlled only to the extent that the set of common values, principles, interests and expectations is sufficiently well integrated, internalized and undertaken in the **identity building process**.

Starting from the sociologic prerequisite, according to which all identities are developed in a natural way, the problem is how, by whom, and last but not least, for whom the **identity building process** takes place. We will take as theoretical background, Manuel Castells’ conception regarding the forms and the origins of the identity building in the context of “network society”, that type of contemporary society where the tension between identity and globalisation is best shown.

To Castells, the social actors’ identity is “the process of construction of **meaning** on the basis of cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning”<sup>26</sup>. This meaning is defined as “the symbolic identification by a social actor of the **purpose** of her/his action”, as elements of identities can be equally considered **sources of meaning** for the actors (themselves) and become real identities when and if social actors internalize them and construct their meaning around this internalization. Meaning and action are, therefore, inseparable, the former being a consequence of the process of redefining the social actor through the purpose of his actions.

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<sup>25</sup> Ole Wæver, *Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in EU Studies*, *Journal of International Affairs*, winter 1995, vol.48, no.2, pp. 389-431(405-407).

<sup>26</sup> Manuel Castells, *Power of Identity*, p. 6.

The three forms of identity building proposed by Castells – **legitimized identity, resistance identity and project identity**<sup>27</sup> – can provide a grid for interpretation of the collective identity building, both in the European Union area, and in the EU neighbourhood. In such a framework of analysis **the act of integration** or the **scenario of cooperation** regimes might be alternatives that can surmount the **danger of fragmentation**.

The **resistance identity**, as a type of defensive identity, built by those actors which perceive the dominant logic as being oppressive, is rather frequently found in the contemporary society, inside or outside the EU, which has been proven by **the scope of some fundamentalist movements**, by the obsession of **territorial separatisms** or by the **various types of nationalism**. Seclusion between the borders drawn by the resistance identity also implies worsening the distance between the excluded and the excluders.

Based on the principle “**exclusion of the excluders by the excluded**”, the forms of collective resistance lead to delimitation of communities or territorial separatisms. The Transnistrian phenomenon, the identity construction within the Republic of Moldova based on the principle of alterity – either Russian or Romanian – or the various forms of Ukrainian nationalism are examples of identity defined based on **the principle of separation**. This is basically the dichotomy “identity survival – existential threat” concerning the entire set of elements defining a nation, an ethnical group or a religious community. The fact that these kinds of threats are rather subjective than objective enhances the subjective dimension of security, so that its classical dilemma becoming even more intricate.

Even within the European Union, the preservation of the national identity, of the ethnical and cultural values, which sometimes led to separatist impulses, represents, beyond the rhetoric of the motto “**unity in diversity**”, which are rather non-violent phenomena of resistance to the invasive movement of the **super-national dimension** of the European construction as against the national dimension. Euro-barometers show a clear trend of the European

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<sup>27</sup> *Legitimized identity* is introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their power vis a vis social actors. *Resistance identity* is generated by those actors that are in the positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to those permeating the institutions of society. *Project identity* emerges when social actors, on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by doing so, seek the transformation of overall society structure.” (Castells, p.8).

citizens to find their bearings within the characteristic features of the citizenship of the state which they belong to, rather than as European citizens, especially in the small states of the Union, fearing that a monolithic integration might lead to a loss of their cultural identity. A good example is the rejection, in a first stage, of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish people, an interesting occurrence just in the country of the Copenhagen School bringing the notion of “societal security” into the theoretical debates on this issue.

Moreover, in the new member states, especially in Romania, the perception of “second-class citizenship / membership”, which stood out immediately after the EU accession is still rather strong. The **complex of second-class membership** to the EU was also strengthened by the perception of the Romanian citizens’ discriminatory access to the EU labour market after accession, as well as by the echo, both at national and European scale, of the expulsion from Italy of Romanian emigrants belonging to the Roma ethnical group at the end of 2007. Romanian collective mentality has not removed yet the border between “in” and “out”, **European project identity** building being at an early stage.

Similar challenges concerning identity building against the EU neighbourhood are also present in the case of the states with European aspirations, included in the ENP, such as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, which are facing a double ambivalence. On the one hand, it is about the “in-between” status given by the **absence of prospect regarding European Union accession** and its being compensated by other types of incentives implied by the “Europeanisation” process of the EU Eastern neighbourhood by means of ENP instruments.

On the other hand, the geopolitical location of these ex-soviet and non-EU states between the EU and Russia generates a second type of ambivalence as regards the impact of the **two types of external influences upon identification** of the national interests of the two countries, either towards Europe or towards Russia.

We could not ignore the **persistent identity of the post-Soviet Union**, as such – Transnistria, Crimea, some areas of Western Ukraine - or as new forms of attraction for a **post-imperial Russian identity**, belonging to the same sentiment well known in Western Europe after colonialism (the **need to belong to a great Empire**, the feeling of security and force by this fact,

as well as the behaviour of some individuals in the former Empire with the feeling and need to conserve somehow the greatness lost in forms like the Commonwealth, the Francophonie organisation, etc.). Moreover, one can notice a deep-rooted perception mostly in the old EU member states that countries such as Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova are geographically in Europe, but mentally and culturally not, except, somehow the western part of Ukraine.

### **Building a European project identity: EU enlargement process and ENP framework**

In Castells' opinion, the **project identity** is a type of offensive identity, built as an extension to and, sometimes, based on the resistance identity. Transformation of the society as a result of interaction between local and regional or global (external influence) can lead to a response of a project identity underpinned, either by the **principle of fragmentation** (territorial separatisms), or by that of **integration** (European integration pattern).

This identity (re)construction pattern can be applied to the very process of defining the EU identity as a global actor. The EU presence on the international stage both as a **regional integration model** and as a **global player** brings to forefront the ambitions of the EU “to project its values internationally”<sup>28</sup>, “extending to its neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the EU”<sup>29</sup>. The export of democratic values, the efforts of contributing the regional stability of the countries in the Union neighbourhood by means of ENP instruments is a part of the EU's the role of international actor (of **civil power, soft power**) undertaking **une mission civilisatrice** beyond its borders. After the EU enlargement policy, the ENP is a framework of performing the European identity.

The process of **building a European identity** has a dynamics based on reciprocity and simultaneousness of the identity building ways. Acting as a regional or global actor, the EU itself tries, on the one hand, to redefine its identity and position regarding the foreign policy it promotes, although,

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<sup>28</sup> Romano Prodi, Cultural diversity and shared values, NY University Law School, 4 November 2003, speech.

<sup>29</sup> Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe – A proximity Policy as the key to stability, Sixth ECSA-World Conference speech, 5-6 December 2002.

neither enlargement nor ENP are formally recognised within the EU as foreign policy instruments.

However, the Union's enlargement can be seen as an approach by which the **EU contributes to strengthening the societal security in the countries**, initially candidates and then members, by stimulating a process of internal reform, which should lead first to observance of the Copenhagen criteria, then to compliance with the other standards gradually imposed within the EU accession negotiations. Democracy and rule of law, market economy and ability to withstand competition describe the minimal standards which the notion of **conditionality** implies and "laid the foundation stones of societal security in the membership process"<sup>30</sup>.

Alongside with the European project identity building process, that should turn the EU efforts into a response to the regional and global challenges, both the countries aspiring to join the EU and the ENP targeted countries face the challenge of building a **project identity EU-oriented**. Such a scenario of transition from **resistance identity** to **project identity** by converting social actors in states such as Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova into "transformer subjects" of a society struck by the dangers of separatisms, inter-ethnic conflicts and perception of an adverse alterity may lead to replication, continuation and complementarities of the European model concerning mitigation of potentially conflict-generating perception differences, overcoming the fragmentation danger and national interest conflicts by a similar integration method, underpinning the European edifice after the Second World War.

### **Resistance identities: anti-integration and anti-globalisation agendas**

In this theoretical framework, it worth making the revue of the resistance identities - as well as legitimized identities, assumed by some the power installed in some states, at some moments – to the **natural processes** that occur in the contemporary world, in this part of Europe. In this respect, we are going to take as proved the idea that the contemporary world, based on the technical achievements, the degree of interaction and the natural process of global knowledge is moving to a globalization as a natural process. In this respect, a lot of literature – beginning with Arnold Toynbee writings and the

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<sup>30</sup> Esther Brimmer, Seeing blue: American visions of the European Union, Chaillot Paper, no 105, September 2007, European Institute for Security Studies.



school that he formed – proved that **the regional integration** process as well as the **globalization** are trends on the way in our actual realities.

In this respect, the EU as a vehicle of regional integration based on the core values of **human rights, democracy, market economy and rule of law** as well as the globalization process give the opportunity of some resistance identity in the framework of “**original democracy**”(Romania 1990-1992), “**managed democracy**”(post-Soviet space 1992-2002), “**sovereign democracy**”(Russia, Belarus, Central Asia 2000-today) that are forms of resistance identity to the process and ideas of altering the rules and values that are constituting the core of the European identity. Nowadays, the forms of resistance identities in the ENP region **are more subtle**, the form is not officially claimed or define as such but the rules are altered, the values are transferred through mimetic and artificial forms only as apparent changes, when the transformation those not occur in the society, norms are not adopted in the full form or are not applied, the society is not influenced by the new values accepted formally.

Regarding the process of **globalization**, some are the instruments that come with it: the rules of World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Found reforms and interdependence, World Bank and its provisions, international competition rules. At least by analyzing the reaction to such institutions and their rules we can see how resistance identity can act in some countries. In this respect - letting aside some legitimate observation on IMF policies – some countries treated those institutions as “**instruments of American imperialism/domination**”, refused to have relations with those institutions at the expenses of their economy, their financial equilibrium or the health of their economic and budgetary system.

This and the **isolation**, some forms of **protectionism** or maintenance of the state in the economy together with the **pre-eminence of the state owned companies** in the access to contracts, altering the market rules, are forms of resistance identity. It happens the same with some “integrative institutions” that avoid real competition and are created to be a framework of maintaining of the former privileges of a **former imperial centre** towards the former periphery – the Community for Independent States(CIS) – or forms of **sustaining the isolationism and avoiding globalization rules** by a group of state, in an imitation of the regional integration institutions – the Economic Community of the CIS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation(SCO) or the CSTO.

## 5. The security dilemma and societal security

The **security dilemma** describes a situation where the actions of one state, in trying to increase its security, causes a perception of insecurity to other states and makes a reaction of the second state in the effort to balance this perception<sup>31</sup>. The result is an escalation of **accumulation of means**, by both actors consequently, in a trial to fill the gap between the perception of the lack of security and the resources to reduce the threat perceived. So the core of the concept lies on **escalatory dynamic**, and the key to this escalation is **ambiguity and uncertainty**.

After such a mechanism, **decision makers are forced to assume the worst**. In an anarchical system or self system as the international system, it is prudent to equate capabilities with intentions. This came from the **assumption that what the other can do, it will, given the opportunity**. That's why measures are taken generating the **spiral of insecurities**, which, in the context of states, is often manifested as arms racing.

In the case of **societal security**, the security dilemma is translated in a more refine way and other means than the military ones are on the stage. For the societal security dilemma, ambiguity is linked with the **two sides of nationalism, ethnic (political) and cultural**, but also with the relation between **status quo** and **reversionism**<sup>32</sup>. Another result is the **exaggerated threat perception or misperception** of threats to societal security that are also producing the reaction of one state at the expenses of the perception of another. All these are parts of the present study, at the level of the regional security of the trilateral of states.

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<sup>31</sup> Paul Roe, Societal Security, in Alan Collins Ed., Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.164-182

<sup>32</sup> Idem, p.175.