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Forth Workshop Report

"Protecting the Alliance's security at strategic distance or closer to home: right balance and false dilemmas".

Timeline: 19th of October 2009 **Forth Workshop:** Military Level

- 1. **Participants**: 62 (Defense policy experts, military personnel, veterans, experts, military media).
- 2. **Goal**: Debates on political-military aspects of the future NATO strategic concept and performing a substantial contribution to the national effort oriented to strengthening the Romanian position regarding the features of the new strategic concept.
- 3. Suggested topics:
 - How to do collective defense effectively in the 21st century? (capabilities/resources);
 - Contingency planning for the new members;
 - -Managing Afghanistan like operations: what lessons learnt for the new strategic concept?;
 - Striking the balance between territorial defense and "out of area operations": doctrine, capabilities and resource requirements:
 - The role of missile defense in the new strategic concept;
 - Defining a NATO role for maritime security.
- **4.** The works were in the Romanian language, except for the presentation by the Chief of NATO's Military Committee, Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola.
- 5. The Program of the Workshop (project): INTRODUCTORY SESSION

14,00-14,05 Opening address by Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning

14,05-14,15 Presentation by Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairmen of NATO Military Committee-VCR

14,15-14.25 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Valeriu Nicut, Deputy for Operations and Training within the General Staff;

14,25-14.40 Discussions;

14,40-14,50 Presentation by Mr. Iulian CHIFU, Director of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning;







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14,50-14,55 Remarks by the Head of the National Defense College

SESSION 1, dedicated to the political-military aspects of the Topics in section 3 above. Political-military elements to be included in the future NATO strategic concept

Moderator: Colonel Mircea MINDRESCU, Acting Head of the National Defence College.

14,55-15,15 Presentation by Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defence Policy

and Planning;

15,15-15.35 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Ion Grosu, Romanian Intelligence Service

representative;

15,35-16,15 Debates; 16,15-16.30 Coffee-break

SESSION 2, dedicated to military aspects of the Topics in section 3 above. Military elements to be included in the future NATO strategic concept Moderator: Bg.Gen Valeriu NICUT.

16,30-16,50 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Virgil Bălăceanu, Strategic Planning

Directorate (J5)/ General Staff;

16,50-17,10 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Dan Plăviţu, Chief of the Military Inteligence Directorate;

17,10-17,50 Debates.

CONCLUSION

17,50-18,00 Concluding remarks by Dragoş Ghercioiu, General Director for Defence Policy and Planning at the end of the works

On the 19th of October 2009, the Workshop no. 4 on "*Protecting Alliance* security at strategic distance or closer to home: right balance and false, dilemmas" was organized at the Ministry of National Defence, between 14.00 and 19.00. It was co-organized by the Romanian National Defense College and the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre and sponsored by the NATO, with the participation of the following guests:

- Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairman of NATO Military Committee-(through VCR)
- Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defence Policy and Planning, MoD;
- Dragos Ghercioiu, General Director for Defense Policy and Planning;
- Colonel Mircea MINDRESCU, Acting Head of National Defence College;
- -Mr. Iulian CHIFU, Director of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning:
- -Brig.Gen. Valeriu Nicut, Deputy for Operations and Training within the General Staff







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- Brig.Gen. Ion Grosu, Romanian Intelligence Service representative;
- Brig.Gen. Virgil Bălăceanu, Strategic Planning Directorate (J5)/ General Staff:
- -Brig.Gen. Dan Plăviţu, Chief of the Military Inteligence Directorate and other 57 participants from institutions and agencies involved in security and defence issues.

The dynamics of the politico-military international scene, the permanent improvement of the tactics used by terrorist organizations and insurgent groups and the security and economic interests of the Alliance member states demand that NATO adopt a more flexible and feasible policy, both at political-strategic level and operational-tactical one.

Taking the suggested topics as baseline, the following ideas have been expressed:

1. How to do collective defense effectively in the 21st century? (capabilities/resources)

The new strategic concept should accomplish at least two major objectives: strengthening the common security and initiating NATO's transformation regarding the planning, the acquisitions and the future expeditionary missions. Therefore, a feasible, quick, expeditionary reaction force that meets the requirements of a new NATO security strategy will be needed. Moreover, in order to avoid the replication of efforts and costs, the transformation process and the training system (through the educational process and common exercises) should be coordinated.

Romania appreciates and works for maintaining the concept of collective defense as a fundamental pillar of the Alliance. Experience has shown that nations must constantly reconfigure the balance of forces needed both for national defense and for the deployment of these forces in remote areas of crisis in NATO operations. This is an additional reason for setting the real needed forces and capabilities required for the full range of military operations, both domestic and beyond, from peacekeeping to combat actions.

Collective defense is and must remain the basic mission of the Alliance and the main component of the operational planning process, while engaging in military operations in response to crisis will be done when the security situation requires and with the available forces. The new Strategic Concept must clearly establish the purpose,







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objectives and functions of the Alliance, define the challenges and threats to its security and indicate the means and capabilities required for confrontation with these threats, but it must define also measures of institutionalization of Article 5, establish rules of engagement and the principles of achieving collective defense and cooperation within it.

2. Contingency planning for the new members

NATO defense planning system (NDPP) is in transition to the new model recently adopted. The onset of the first full cycle taking into account the new model will be marked by the development of the new Strategic Concept (SC), which will be taken directly to planning. Today at NATO HQ is considered that the document "Comprehensive Political Guidance", endorsed at the Riga summit, is still valid and, therefore, key issues referring to defense planning can be taken in the New Strategic Concept.

Romania must militate for a balanced presentation within the New Strategic Concept of the two strategic objectives: involvement in actual crises management and transformation of capabilities, meaning to accustom oneself to requirements of previewed security environment. The efficient use of resources in the process of capabilities development, which in our opinion is extended beyond defense planning, for many allied states is also influenced by the EU needs for specific capabilities evolution. Consequently a clearer expression of NATO's desire for cooperation, at least in the field of defense planning, is imperative.

3. Managing Afghanistan - like operations: what lessons learnt for the new strategic concept?

Estimating the influence upon the New Strategic Concept of the lessons learned following NATO operations in Afghanistan, NATO can be defined as one of the main actors' participants to the global management of the civil and military crises. A new approach is the concept on unification of the main actors' efforts under the same goal during their involvement in a conflict or crisis. This concept has multiple meanings and a common definition is unlikely to be agreed on a short and medium term. NATO must coordinate its own actions with this community in non-Article 5 crisis, such as:

- -unity of efforts, provision of integrated estimate and planning of the processes without any restriction regarding the information exchange;
- -military activity integration with multiple actors and achievement of synchronic work in cooperation;







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-provision of essential directions and of a coherent strategy

The present military strategy in Afghanistan is exclusively focused on security and economy and pay attention to the possibility of capitalizing success from a possible progress in the cultural domain able to support the efforts for population's protection by Taliban's` isolation. In Afghanistan two of the three fundamental pillars of the participation by a contingent in a mission out of own country's borders (determining factors specific to any counter-insurgency operation) have become fragile: international force credibility against the insurgents` wish and the population's support /confidence.

In order to consolidate the affected pillars some actions aiming at obtaining the population's support/trust simultaneously with insurgents' neutralization are in progress.

4. Striking the balance between territorial defense and "out of area operations": doctrine, capabilities and resource requirements

Although the Alliance proved after the Cold War a great capacity for adaptation, by admitting new members, reorganizing the command structure and the missions, which permitted the dislocation of forces beyond the traditional area of responsibility, a range of factors have led to additional obstacles in developing and implementing a coherent strategy of the Alliance. These factors are due mainly to the lack of a common perception of the risks and threats or the inability of the European Allies to allocate enough resources for the on-going missions.

Engagement in out of area operations as a consequence of the need to combat the threats has determined a modification of the strategic operations organization and planning profile. This fact must not induce to the small states of the Alliance the perception of a deeper tendency to marginalize their own national interests in the field of security.

The debates concerning the new NATO strategic concept have as a background the increase of a certain internal criticism regarding the non-fulfillment of the objectives assumed at the RIGA Summit (2006). This led to the reluctance of certain member states to support NATO with forces, especially for the ISAF operations. Some others thinks that NATO should focus not only on the asymmetrical threats but also on the classical ones. The next Strategic Concept must involve NATO in regions of great economical-strategic interest, like the Arctic region.







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Following an intense and permanent dialogue with the nations, NATO military authorities recommended the main development guidelines for the elaboration of the new strategic concept on different levels: operational; capabilities and transformation; partnerships. From the military point of view one can conclude that some components regarded as highly important need to be part of the new strategic concept.

<u>For the operational field</u> the following can resume the main guidelines: reanalyzing Article 5 through the common understanding of the configuration of a possible future attack; clarifying the relation between common defense and common security (here we can find energy security, cyber defense, diminishment of the international criminality); ensuring a unique perspective about taking on common risks in the operations, which means participating with troops and/or financial compensation of those costs; maintaining a balance between the missions under or beyond the incidence of Article 5.

For the field of capabilities and transformations: developing transformation programs and/or building the capabilities the Alliance will need in order to respond to the estimated risks and threats: to reorganize the capabilities in order to ensure a quick response in crisis situations; to prepare the operations carried out together with other organizations/ international actors; to improve the strategic communication to deliver a convincing political message; to harmonize inside the Alliance the command and forces structures that are responsible also for the costs covering the actual deficits from the common fund; to coordinate the construction of a quick reaction force that has to be correlated to the EU requirements and to NATO training and instruction system.

For the field of partnerships the New Strategic Concept must take into account: the intensification of the interaction with international actors: UN, EU, OSCE; (re) establishing cooperation relations with Russia; continuing the partnership programs (PfP, MD, ICI); strengthening the relations with non-NATO states and with other international actors in order to extend NATO's role in ensuring security and stability beyond the traditional regions of interest; developing the relation with the EU for a better cooperation, as the two organizations are complementary: the forces are the same for both organizations, the procedures and techniques has to be identical, and the priorities should be harmonized as they have the same type of deficits.

5. The role of missile defense in the new strategic concept

The background of Romania's participation within NATO MD initiative comprises the interest of being connected to the allied efforts, the development of an allied anti-missile







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system and the guarantee that it covers its whole national territory. Romania's position is based on two essential principles: the indivisibility of security within NATO and collective solidarity towards the countries vulnerable to missile attacks.

The contemporary strategic environment, development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, including the possibility of using loads capable of mass destruction constitutes a significant threat to NATO's territory and population. This threat is magnified by more sustained efforts of nations to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery capacities with increasing range of action. NATO missile defense program was designed precisely to protect the territory, population and forces (including those deployed in theaters of operations) against these types of weapons.

NATO must continue dialogue on security implications of missile systems, both in consultations with other allies and with partner countries.

In particular, when it comes to the relationship with Russia, NATO can decide in favor of promoting an open dialogue on this subject and identify concrete ways of cooperation depending on the evolution of the project, and Russia's interest in this respect, starting with the idea that Black Sea security is impossible without a strong commitment of this country.

6. Defining a NATO role for maritime security

NATO represents an Alliance composed of nations with broad coastland, old maritime traditions, great naval capabilities and strong commercial interests, who supposes and imposes that NATO should play an active role in ensuring and maintaining the Allies' maritime security. NATO's role in the maritime security should be complementary to the tasks fulfilled by maritime authorities and by civil national and international agencies responsible for imposing the law.

The new strategic concept will have to specify which are the maritime missions that need to be taken into account by the Alliance, what will be the role of nations' navy forces, the distribution of responsibilities between the nations, the definition of the borders between defense and security, the limits of participation in case of supportive actions of the authorities responsible for imposing the law.

The strategic interests of the Alliance from the perspective of the maritime security can be spotted out as follows:

- the protection of the territorial integrity and maritime coast of the member states:







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- ensuring the population, equipment and infrastructure protection in the maritime area:
- preventing the proliferation of mass destruction arms;
- protection of the critical and energy infrastructure;
- ensuring the freedom of navigation and the access to resources (at the surface or sub aquatic);

The identified or expected maritime risks and threats to the Alliance can be included in two categories: current threats (attacks against ships, using ships charged with chemical or radiological material as weapons, transporting WMD, etc), and future threats (threats to the stability and the security of the Arctic region, migration due to the rise of seas' and oceans' level, natural calamities, lack of resources, intensification of the competition for natural resources etc).

The success of ensuring and maintaining maritime security depends largely on the good cooperation regarding the exchange of intelligence between civil agencies that impose the law, international organizations (UN, EU, IMO), NGOs, etc. The cooperation is thus the key for success.

In the context of multidimensional important changes of the international geostrategic environment, nations are waiting that the New Strategic Concept synthesize all elements which have not only to include and to represent the Allies interests, but also to set, in enough flexible terms, the NATO way in the military, diplomatic, communication spectrum, at least for the next decade. The solution, even a partial one, leads to the conclusion that the Alliance is and will be not only a global security exporter but also a security builder.

LIST OF INVITED PERSONS To the Workshop no.4 of 19-th October 2009 organized at the Ministry of National Defense, conference room 128, on:

"Protecting Alliance security at strategic distance or closer to home: right balances and false dilemmas"

- Mihai STANISOARA, Minister of National Defense (or his personal representative)
- Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola (through VTC), Chief of NATO Military Committee











MoD Department for Defense Policy and Planning:

- Viorel OANCEA, Secretary of state for Defense Policy and Planning (representative);
- Brig.Gen.Eng. Alexandru COTOARA-NICOLAE, Chief of International Co-operation in the Field of Defense Directorate (representative) and a specialist;
- Şerban LUNGU, Director of the Integrated Planning Directorate (representative) and a specialist;
- Mrs. Elena FRUNZETI, Deputy Director of Defence Policies Directorate (representative) and a specialist;

MoD Department of Armaments

- Brig.Gen.Eng. Catalin MORARU, Deputy Secretary of State for Armaments and a specialist;

General Staff:

- Brig.Gen Valeriu NICUT, Deputy for Operations and Training;
- Brig.Gen. Alexandru RUS PhD, Chief of J 3 Directorate and two specialists;
- Brig.Gen. Virgil BALACEANU PhD, Chief of J 5 Directorate and two specialists;
- Brig.Gen. Mihai CHIRITA, PhD, Chief of J 7 Directorate and two specialists;

Land Forces Staff:

- Maj.Gen. Ion PALSOIU PhD, Deputy Chief of Staff (representative) and a specialist;

Air Forces Staff:

- Air Flotilla Gen. Virgil RISTEA, Deputy Chief of Staff (representative) and a specialist;

Navy Staff:

- Rear-Admiral Niculae VALSAN Deputy Chief of Staff (representative) and a specialist;

MoD Defense Intelligence General Directorate:

-Maj.Gen Ilie BOTOS PhD, Deputy General Director (representative);







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- Brig.Gen. Dan PLAVITU, Chief of Military Intelligence Directorate (representative) and two specialists;
- Col. Marian HAPAU, Chief of Counterintelligence and Military Security Directorate (representative) and two specialists.

Military Mass-media:

- one representative of the MoD Information and Public Relations Directorate
- one representative of the General Staff Information and Public Relations Section

Institute for Defense Policy Studies and Military History:

- Maj.Gen. (R) Mihail IONESCU, Director of the Institute;

National Defense University "Carol I":

- Lieutenant- General Teodor FRUNZETI .Commandant (Rector) of the National Defense University "Carol I" (representative);
- Colonel Prof. Constantin MOSTOFLEI PhD, Director of the Center for Strategic, Defense and Security Studies.

National Defence College

- Colonel Mircea MINDRESCU, Acting Head of the National Defence College;

Romanian Intelligence Service:

- George Cristian MAIOR, Director of Romanian Intelligence Service (or his Deputy) and 4-7 specialists;

Conflicts Prevention and Early Warning Center:

- Assoc.Prof. lulian CHIFU, Director of the Center and 4 -7 specialists;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

- Cândea Ion, 2nd Secretary, Security Policy Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ana Tinca, director, 1st Secretary, Security Policy Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs