Iulian Chifu
 - Thank you all for coming to this event organised by the CPC EW, we will use a round table format for the discussions and try to put as much emphasis as possible on the second part, the Q&A.

Canadian Ambassador
The peace keeping environment is becoming erratically more complex
UN peace missions have expanded into regional coalition operations
The wide range of civil NGOs involved in peace keeping are the key
We need a greater mix o skills for returning conflict societies to peace
Government policy enhances the international effort to manage conflicts
to support research and dialogue
global network for professors , researchers, students and journalists

David Morin

I will talk about the regionalization of peace operations, which is part of the evolutions of operations, one might even say a crucial aspect, the way in which the structure and participation of Romania in peace operations - 75% of Romanian troops are deployed in NATO led missions, 20% in EU led missions and 5% in UN led missions.

First of all we have the divide between UN operations and NATO operations and the regionalization effects and its pertinence.
Regionalization means
- a multiplication of actors, including (regional) organisations, involved in peace keeping
- troop contributing countries focusing on certain areas or organisations (only)

Regionalization is now a reality with 48% of military personnel deployment being accountable to UN missions, 40% NATO and 12% other organisations like the EU or the African Union

We therefore have

positive interpretations:
- growing implication of regional organisations in peacekeeping
- selective implication of important troops contributing countries
- contingents deployed in their own region

and

negative interpretations
- UN's role (the most democratic institution) becomes blurry
- lack of interest of important troop contributing countries for deployments in other regions (there are less and less EU and US troops in African Continent); a relatively selfish practice

As for the legal basis we have the creative interpretation of the UN Charter which was later validated

- Nothing excludes regional action
- implicit subsidiary

- the Security Council has the monopoly of coercive measures

Nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council with the exception of measures against any enemy state.

Justification through subsidiarity principle

Monopoly of the UN Security council (Iraq); this monopoly could become obsolete in time.

Concerning the Historical evolution we can first talk about the doctrine evolution and its two stages

- 1992 - An agenda for peace

rising importance of regional initiatives

pragmatic approach

ways of subordination

resolution of the general assembly (1993)

- 1995 - supplement to an agenda for peace

5 types of cooperation (consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, joint operation)

4 main principles(consultation mechanisms, primacy of the UN, clear division of labour, coherence of the member state's actions)

defines the nature of the relations between regional organisations and the UN

The deadly trilogy: Bosnia(1991-1995), Somalia(1992-1995) and Rwanda(1993-1996)

- Contrary to first generation operations UNPROFOR, UNOSOM and UNAMIR plunged the Blue Helmets into ongoing conflicts

- two issues were raised: what attitude should the Force adopt towards the party responsible for rekindling or continuing violence; and were the lightly armed Blue Helmets actually secure?

- given the UN mission in the Balkans, the UN never reversed the tendency to reinforce peacekeeping units' firepower, which later on led to "Robust Peacekeeping".

Concerning the Brahimi Report whose importance I think we all are aware of it:

- encourages the cooperation with regional organisations
- disparity in the capacity between regional organisations
- formation and support of regional organisations

As for regionalisation today we have the second generation of peace keeping which has the following characteristics

- more complex - the operation have further evolved, there are more types of actors, development agencies, bilateral donors, international institutions (world bank)
- more robust - we must find the means to achieve our objectives
- integrated approach
- a new burden sharing
- regionalization - a specialisation of regional organisations regarding certain issues or geographical areas
a specialisation of troop contributing countries to certain organisations or areas.

Furthermore there are three clusters namely:
1. The Asian African Nexus
- the UN, the African Union and sub regional African organizations - main actors
- Africans and Asians make up most of the UN personnel - developing their own increasingly important capabilities
- ASEAN role is more political than military

2. Euro Middle Eastern Nexus
- NATO, EU and OSCE - main actors
- Large European presence in the Balkans, Lebanon and Afghanistan

3. Regional specializations?
- specialization of troop contributing countries and organizations

1. The Asian African Nexus

- In this nexus the UN is the largest peace operation platform accounting for over 80% of all deployments
- Over 80% of military personnel were drawn from the continents themselves and three primary external contributors: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan
- This nexus comprises three sub regional clusters of conflicts: West Africa, Central Africa and the DRC and the broader Horn

Out of the top 10 troop contributing countries to the UN PKO not one is European or American.

Africa - a major regional issue

- three major arenas for the UN PKO
- around 75% of the UN peacekeepers currently deployed can be found in Africa
- current UN budget for operations in Africa: $ 4.39 bln. for 2009 - 2010 (almost 45% of the 7.75 bln total UN budget for PK)
- a significant troop contributor: 1/3 of total UN peacekeepers in the world

The African Union
- the African peace and security architecture (APSA)
- States, UA and CERs
- Early Warning System, Panel of the Wise, African Standby Force (ASF) and Peace funds
- UN/UA Partnership
- Past AU Peace operations: NMOG in Rwanda, OMIB in Burundi, OMIC in Comoros, JMC in DRC and OLMEE in Erit/Eth

As for the UN/AU Partnership the synchronization stands thus:

African Union	United Nations
AMIB	ONUB
ECOMIL	UNMIL
AMIS	AU/UN hybrid
AMISOM	UN?

And a lot more could be added about the absence of Western personnel in Africa with 1.8% coming from Europe and 0.1% from North America

2. Euro-Middle Eastern Nexus

- operations in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia stretching from Lebanon through Afghanistan to Nepal
- in this nexus NATO is the largest peace operation platform mostly in Kosovo and Afghanistan - we need more civilian forces
- this cluster relied heavily on European forces under UN command (mainly in Lebanon), EU deployments in Gaza and the West Bank, and NATO troops in Afghanistan
- In Lebanon, where Europeans made up the bulk of UNIFIL's expansion during 2006, maintained 65% of the troops under UN helmets there and over 50% of the over 41 000 NATO troops under ISAF in Afghanistan

Concerning regional involvement in the Balkans NATO accounts for 65%, the Commonwealth of Independent States for 24% and the EU for 11%/ The UN forces have completely disappeared.

3. Regional Specializations (should we consider that certain countries have a monopoly over peace keeping operations? Latin America in Haiti for example?)
This cluster consists of a variety of regional specializations with a combination of various platforms:
- Latin America composed UN force in Haiti
- the mainly Australian and New Zealand military presence in Timor Leste
- the Australian led presence in the Solomon Islands
- the ongoing European presence - under the EU, NATO and OSCE across the Western Balkans

What we have to ask ourselves: is regionalization beneficial?

Advantages
- proximity and speed (Kosovo)
- involvement and commitment
- probability of consensus
- consent of parties (less neutrality when neighbours intervene)

Disadvantages
- neutrality
- involvement of regional powers
- capacity of TCC
- legitimacy of the intervention
- external interferences
- non-interference of external powers

Iulian Chifu
Well we have a lot of questions following Mr. Morin's presentation
We can't talk about global coordination, it's very difficult to categorise regionalisation
What is the reason for participating in peace operations - the interests that guides the means of involvement by different types of coalitions by respecting international principles

Theodor Melescanu - on the Romanian contribution to military operations

First of all we must make a clear distinction

- peace keeping (UN specialty, keeping the parties involved separately) very important but creates a lot of practical problems
- peace enforcement - field objectives are different; caveats are much reduced. They can react in advance and are very energetic (NATO troops are best placed here)
- peace building (EU and other regional organisations are best place) combines military measures with economic support, democratic society building

At a conceptual level Romania has 2 priorities: the Caucasus and the Western Balkans

Differences between operations are decided by organisational structures (UN OSCE - duty bound to respect decisions and coalitions of the willing - separate treatment - sometimes very political)

The evolution of the main reasoning for participation is pretty important. We are a middle sized country and the big number of troops was explained by different reasons (before 2004 we wanted to join NATO and we needed to prove ourselves useful). We wanted to show that we are not only peace consumers but also peace contributors.

- increase in interoperability (NATO, EU)
- check their technological capabilities 0 armoured, personnel etc
- check troops' training level, preparation and readiness for future ops

The only problem is the financial one - all the money comes from the MOD's annual budget and the decision to send 600 more troops is a political one. Furthermore the

budget level is extremely low - we need proper financing from the reserve fund which is at the disposal of the government.

Another constraint is the legal system for decision making concerning troops' deployment
- decision or invitation (coalition of the willing)
- analysis and debate in the Supreme Council for State Defence
- Parliament notification

We have the capacity to participate with more troops but we also need the financing

Iulian Chifu

Having PRT teams on the ground is extremely important
Once we begin all three processes simultaneously we will see a faster evolution process. We must also learn from experience and past missions

Adrian Cristian Bratu

I will talk about civil instruments for crisis management but not from an official position, merely personal guidelines for the national defence strategy for capacity building
A process for clarifying the vision in this area is necessary - while there is no theoretical framework there are 3 elements: comprehensive approach, civil military synchronization around international actors. A condition for success is a constructive involvement of local actors

This problem is more challenging than the military one, there are more areas of experts (police, judicial).
In this new framework - we find a new kind of expert, one that is capable of working in crisis management but who has other types of skills as well. These experts are the foundation of civil crisis management but you only have them to the extent you train them. You also need to have them ready to be deployed - what do you do with them between missions however?

The EU is the most important actor in civil crisis management - most of its missions are civilian or civil-military and all have been successful but the EU has to improve its civil crisis management system and can do so through the following means
- making up its mind on how to manage this process in Brussels
- make sure all member states consider civil crisis management a priority (not all states have made progress here, albeit Romania has)
- successfully finalise civilian headline goal 2010; ensuring the supply of experts
- bring much needed coordination

Romania has a good record of involvement and a considerable pool of experts - some 210 deployed in January 2010

There are still some problems which are usually solved ad-hoc: training needs and budget needs. We should also take advantage of the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation niche where Romania can bring added value - we are looking forward to establishing the Centre for Post Conflict Reconstruction with the aim of training our experts but also experts from abroad as well.

We need a research facility intergrating the lessons learned. So for there has been no formal structure for it but it has a dedicated pesonnel assigned and involved in different activities since 2008 with another module coming this year; we hope that the centre will be formally established by September 2010 either in the MFA or as a separate agency

Iulian Chifu

The comprehensive approach is the key here
We have to underline Romania's priorities learn from the PRT's, use the idea of nation building, civil crisis management in order to use the expertise and lessons learned
We have capabilities that can be used on the ground and in dealing with civilian problems' (water, utilities)
Using the lessons learned on the field is the key.

David Morin

I'd like to point out some issues worth discussing
- concerning NATO and peace enforcement and NATO specialisation - Who will make peace building in Africa. The NATO monopoly is not necessarily a good thing
- concerning the financial aspect - UN operations give money to participating countries - some countries managed to modernise their army thanks to money from the UN.
- conceptualising the practice - regional "decoupage" - by the great powers
- the lessons learned are limited specificities and differences lead to the fact that it is extremely difficult to apply model x to situation Y.
- And last one half of Blue Helmets are involved in missions in francophone territories (Haiti, Congo, Lebanon, Cote d'Ivoire) we need francophone experts. Romania is thus very well placed

Questions

Sergiu Celac
How do you classify the document signed recently by the UN Secretary General? Is it a forth annex in the list you mentioned earlier or does it fit one of the three previous categories? We hear about the context than what it really means in official terms

Sergiu Medar
How do you define success in peace keeping operations?

David Morin

For the first question I really cannot add anything interesting, I'm not an expert on its effects
The economic crisis has not really had a negative impact on contributions, quite the contrary and Haiti is a good indicator for that. These missions are to important to be pulled back simply because of economic interests.
As for the second question - success is relative - it depends on objectives, the limits and it is not a general rule. For example in Timor Leste or Kosovo- considering the magnitude of the objectives the result isn't that bad. And if we leave tomorrow? What would happen in Kosovo?

Finally we find ourselves face with the same solutions - NATO will find itself in the same situation the UN is facing now, in a couple of decades. We must focus missions on civilian protection and give the population the means to protect itself.

Questions

Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova
1.How do you define the legitimisation of the presence of Russian forces on Moldovan soil since they are not UN mandated?
What are the best practices for shifting from peace keeping to peace building?

Canadian Embassy representative
2.Is there a connection to the civilian side; is having increasingly more involvement from regional organisations a positive thing?

Corina Simon (PATRIR)
3.How can we cooperate with either institutions or missions at EU/Romanian level better suited for crisis management now considering the complex channels of communication?

David Morin
1. I will not pronounce myself
2. There are no fixed acceptable limits between the two and quite often states become fragile if the transition does not take place as fast as it should.
3. Integrated missions - all actors have to be on the field. In Haiti the system was very fragile; The MFA coordinated process obliged the main actors to meet. This is more commonly known as the wall of government approach - who manages the effort and who organises the meetings?