

**Iulian Chifu**

**THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF  
EUROPE: NATO AND ESDP**

**Proceedings of the conference “NATO AND THE ESDP:  
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT”**

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**“NATO AND THE ESDP: DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE  
BUCHAREST SUMMIT”  
Intercontinental Hotel, 24 October 2008**

09.30 – 10.00 Registration

**10.00 – 10.30 Opening remarks**

**Iulian Chifu - Director CPCEW**

**Teodor Meleșcanu – Minister of National Defense**

**Henri Paul – Ambassador of France in Romania**

10.30 – 12.00 ESDP and NATO. Cooperation, complementarities and rivalry.

**Moderator:** Cornel Codiță, program director, CPCEW

**Christophe Cornu**, NATO & Multilateral Affairs Section /  
Political Affairs Division / NATO International Secretariat

**Nicole Taillefer**, French Presidency representative

**Mary Sharpe**, expert, UK

**Daniel Ioniță** – Director for Security Policies, Romanian  
MFA

**Dragoș Ghercioiu**, General Director, Department for  
Defense Policy and Planning Romanian MOD

**Ioan Mircea Pascu**, former MOD, „shadow report person“  
PS, EU-NATO relations

**Sergiu Medar**, former Romanian NSA

- 12.00 – 12.30 Coffee Break
- 12.30 – 14.00 Perspectives of NATO and ESDP. SSR criteria and request for future EU countries.  
**Moderator: Christophe Cornu**, NATO  
**Constantin Degeratu**, State Counselor, Presidential Administration  
**Mr. Rory Domm**, Council of the European Union, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Affaires extérieures et politico-militaires, Transatlantic relations  
**Elena Frunzeti**, Deputy Director, Policy Direction, MApN  
**Constantin Dudu Ionescu** – former MOD  
**Cristopher Ellis**, Political military officer, US Embassy  
**Ștefan Tinca**, general director, Analysis and Political planning, Romanian MFA  
**Iulian Chifu**, director, CPCEW
- 14.00 – 15.00 Lunch
- 15.00 – 16.30 **NATO and ESDP: views from the partners and aspirant countries. Open Debate.**  
**Moderator: Iulian Chifu CPCEW**  
**Debate participants:**  
**Oleksyi Melnik**, Razumkov Center, Ukraine  
**Viorel Ciubotaru**, NATO information Center, Republic of Moldova  
**Tengiz Pkaladze**, Chairman ICGS, Georgia  
**Anar Cehangirli**, Department for Security, Azerbaijani MFA  
**Oleksandr Sushko**, Euroatlantic Association, Ukraine  
**Oazu Nantoi**, Institute of Public Policies, Republic of Moldova
- 16.30-17.00 **Conclusions**  
**Cornel Codiță**, program Director, CPCEW
- 18.00 **Dinner**

**CAPITOLUL I**  
**Opening remarks**



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## Introduction

### **Iulian Chifu**

*Director, CPCEW*

Ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you and begin this conference on NATO and the ESDP developments after the Bucharest Summit, a conference that our Centre of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning organized with the support of NATO, the French Embassy and German Marshall Fund here in Romania.

This is a very important aspect that we need to discuss nowadays: the defense and the security of Europe done through the means that we already have there, done through the organizations that we share and it is also very important not only after the events of Russia-Georgian war, but also we had seen that the French Presidency has put in front of its interests the ESDP and the reforms that should be made in the ESDP framework.

It is also important for our partners, the states that are situated in the Eastern part of Romania: Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, so we need to fill them with the content of this debate because they have the same types of debate and even tougher in their regions and they are thinking at their security and defense.

That's why we organize this conference hoping to have a discussion on the agenda of the EU-NATO relations, especially in the Defense and Security matters. The proceedings of this conference are reunited in the present book.

## **Towards a new strategic common vision between NATO and ESDP**

**Teodor Meleşcanu,**  
*Romanian Minister of Defense*

Please allow me first to thank the co-organizers of the NATO and the ESDP Conference 2008, The Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre, the NATO Public Diplomacy division, the German Marshall Fund's Black Sea Trust and the French Presidency for their efforts in fulfilling this job.

It gives me a great pleasure and honor to address this distinguished audience. In this framework, I would like to briefly present you some issues related to the NATO-ESDP perspectives after the Bucharest Summit.

The debate around the concern that EU and NATO have an under-developed or a blocked relationship is not recent. Nevertheless, the progress registered by the transatlantic partnership shows the relevance of the political commitment in building a strong and lasting relation. There is no doubt that the Bucharest Summit was a major political event with a complex agenda, forging a solid link between the previous Summit in Riga and the anniversary one in 2009. The Heads of State and Government recognized on this occasion the enduring value of the transatlantic link, while acknowledging "the value that a stronger and more capable European defense brings, providing capabilities to address the common challenges both NATO and EU face".

The Bucharest Summit gave a significant impulse to enhance the NATO-EU relationship especially through an extended cooperation on the theatre of operations in Afghanistan in the spirit of the comprehensive approach. Previous successful experiences as the EU operation Althea through the Berlin Plus arrangements serve as an example of the two organizations working side by side in common crisis management



operations. However, diplomatic and political solutions are yet to be identified in order to ensure an efficient cooperation while providing a secure work environment for the EU personnel involved in the theatre missions.

NATO needs as partner a stronger EU the recent discussions around an updated European Security Strategy, designed to take into account the last two considerable waves of enlargement, encourage us to think that the common vision that EU and NATO share will soon get translated into a more practical approach of the security issues of common concern for the Euro-Atlantic partners. A step forward towards an enhanced cooperation was undertaken in April, at Bucharest, and got materialized under the form of French-British initiative concerning the deficit in mission-capable helicopters with funds, pilots and rotary-wing aircrafts. This initiative will certainly have a positive impact on the long run as regards the complementary progress of the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups projects and therefore contribute to the strengthening of transatlantic security bond.

Moreover, the vision of complementary ESDP-NATO is currently being pushed forward by the French Presidency that came with the initiative of setting up a High Level Group that would call together representatives of the NATO's International Secretariat and of the Javier Solana's Secretariat, SACEUR, as well as military commanders of the EU operations. By bringing forth this informal forum for the exchange of information on the planning and management of operations, the two organizations will set the premises for interaction on a regular basis and the chance to enhance a better coherence on the field, without replacing the formal transatlantic dialogue.

The Romanian strategic interests coincide with the priorities of the French Presidency of the EU Council regarding the consolidation of the transatlantic cooperation and the West Balkans stabilization. The most difficult, concrete challenge that NATO and ESDP currently face is in the area of military capabilities and generating forces for their respective operations. We therefore support the reinforcement of the role that the NATO-EU Group plays in the field of capabilities by encouraging the

coordination and harmonization within the process of developing the military capacities. As an EU and NATO Member State, Romania remains fully committed to keep its engagements to both of the organizations and continue its support for the ESDP development that we consider to be essential for an efficient Euro-Atlantic cooperation.

All in all, significant progress was achieved so far in the cooperation between the two organizations in the field of military operations. However, improving the cooperation between EU and NATO remains extremely important, especially in the context of the ESDP missions in Afghanistan and the EU involvement in Kosovo. The cooperation between the two organizations is crucial not only for achieving the desired end state-stable and democratic entities-but also for the credibility of both organizations. Hence, we hope that NATO's interaction with EU in ESDP context will evolve from a simple cooperation after the launching of the operations to a process based on well defined procedures and practices, at a strategic and tactical level.

Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso once said "We (Europeans) are in many ways a superpower. We are a moral power". Nevertheless, this already common distinction between the hawkish power spread by NATO focusing on its core military added value and the dovish power of a softer EU that contributes to the global security with civilian missions or police may soon be surpassed. The two organizations share not only common values and strategic interests, but also a significant number of member countries able to put their resources at service. In consequence, the political leadership will have to play an increasing role in the development of a new strategic common vision and of a set of priorities that will consolidate the concrete cooperation between the two organizations.

I wish to salute once more our hosts' initiative to engage us into this constructive debate which I perceive as an excellent food for thought for future reunions and I would like to express my hope that the Bucharest Summit was only a warm up stage in consolidating the Euro-Atlantic partnership before the historical summit announced for 2009 at Strasburg and Kehl.

## « L'OTAN et la PESD: développements après le Sommet de Bucarest »

**Henri Paul**

*Ambassador of France in Romania*

Mesdames,  
Messieurs,

L'Ambassade de France a tenu à s'associer à cette conférence, dans le cadre de la Présidence française du Conseil de l'Union européenne. Les développements de l'interaction entre la PESD et l'OTAN sont en effet l'une des priorités que la France a souhaité mettre à l'ordre du jour de sa Présidence.

Il s'agit d'une part de renforcer la PESD et la stratégie européenne de sécurité et d'autre part d'inscrire la défense européenne dans une vision politique renouvelée, fondée sur la complémentarité entre la défense européenne et l'OTAN.

### **1. La PESD et la stratégie européenne de sécurité**

#### **A. PESD**

- La France a fait de la **relance de la politique de sécurité et de défense une priorité pour la PFUE**.
- En effet, depuis dix ans, des progrès importants ont été faits: l'Union s'est dotée d'instruments opérationnels pour la PESD; quinze opérations civiles et militaires ont été conduites (Balkans, Afrique, Moyen-Orient, Asie); tous les pays européens sont désormais intéressés au développement de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD). L'Union accomplit un travail remarquable dans ses opérations de gestion de crises, comme au Tchad (EUFOR).
- Le Traité de Lisbonne donne un nouvel élan à l'Union, dont les Européens peuvent profiter pour relancer la défense européenne. Le Traité pose le cadre juridique, politique et institutionnel de la

PESD. Il faut maintenant passer au concret et mettre sur place une vision partagée et des moyens européens de défense crédibles.

- **Aujourd'hui, le fait est que les moyens des Européens ne sont pas à la hauteur des crises et des menaces actuelles et futures, et ne correspondent pas à leur niveau de développement économique et technologique.**

Il nous faut aussi disposer de partenaires fiables pour faire face aux défis de sécurité commun, c'est pourquoi la France propose d'améliorer la relation Union européenne – OTAN (21 membres de l'Union sur 27 sont aussi membres de l'OTAN), en particulier là où les deux organisations sont engagées ensemble.

Face aux menaces et aux risques, nous avons besoin d'avantage d'unité et de détermination.

- L'objectif central de la PFUE est de créer les conditions d'un renforcement des capacités opérationnelles, avant tout militaires, à disposition de l'Union.

Nous voulons franchir une étape importante d'ici décembre 2008, en fixant le cap de l'effort à conduire dans les dix prochaines années et en l'illustrant par des projets concrets.

La priorité que nous accordons à la défense européenne s'inscrit dans une vision politique renouvelée, fondée sur la complémentarité entre la défense européenne et l'OTAN.

Nous sommes attachés à construire sur cette logique de complémentarité entre la PESD et l'OTAN, partagée par les Européens et par nos partenaires américains.

Nous sommes aussi conscients des sensibilités différentes qui existent en Europe sur la politique de défense. Nous voulons avancer avec pragmatisme.

## B. Stratégie européenne de sécurité

- Les Européens ont adopté en 2003 une « stratégie européenne de sécurité ».

Ce document dressait un constat des principales menaces et proposait une orientation générale pour l'action extérieure de l'Union, qui restent valides.

- Il est apparu nécessaire, cinq ans après l'adoption de cette stratégie et à la veille de mettre en œuvre le traité de Lisbonne, de mettre à jour notre analyse des menaces et d'améliorer, là où cela est nécessaire, la mise en œuvre de cette stratégie.

C'est ce que le Conseil européen du 14 décembre 2007 a demandé à Javier Solana, d'ici décembre 2008.

Ce travail est très important parce qu'à partir de cette analyse renouvelée, les moyens de défense et des mesures de renforcement de la sécurité pourront être mieux définis.

- Pour la France, il est souhaitable que ce travail reflète l'évolution des principales menaces, identifiées en 2003 : les crises régionales, la prolifération, le terrorisme, la déliquescence des États, et fasse ressortir les nouveaux défis :
  - la croissance de la menace balistique,
  - la sécurité des approches maritimes de l'Union et la lutte contre la piraterie ;
  - la sécurité énergétique (en particulier la sécurité des transports et des infrastructures) ;
  - les trafics illicites d'armes et les flux proliférants ;
  - les cyber-attaques ;
  - la sécurité spatiale ;

Il devrait aussi souligner les facteurs et les risques pouvant entraîner des conséquences pour la sécurité de l'Union, notamment les changements climatiques.

Au-delà du constat, ce document pourra couvrir les moyens d'améliorer la mise en œuvre, comme :

- les conséquences du lien croissant entre sécurité intérieure et sécurité extérieure,
- le caractère central de capacités militaires et civiles crédibles en Europe,
- la valeur de la coopération UE-OTAN, dans une perspective de complémentarité,
  
- **M. Solana a tout le soutien de la France pour conduire ce travail, d'ici le Conseil européen de décembre 2008.**

## **2. L'OTAN**

Lors du sommet de l'OTAN à Bucarest, le **Président de la République a confirmé l'engagement de la France au sein de l'Alliance** en marquant notre **volonté de rénover notre relation avec l'OTAN tout en faisant progresser l'Europe de la défense**. Ces deux ambitions vont de pair pour la France, et pourraient aboutir pour le sommet du 60<sup>ème</sup> anniversaire de l'Alliance atlantique, après la Présidence française de l'Union Européenne du second semestre 2008.

Le Président de la République et la Chancelière allemande ont proposé de tenir le sommet de 2009 à **Strasbourg et à Kehl**, pour marquer l'importance de l'Europe au sein de l'Alliance atlantique.

- Dès le début de son mandat, le Président de la République a souhaité qu'on examine, sans tabous, la possibilité d'une rénovation de nos relations avec l'OTAN, afin que la France puisse y prendre toute sa place.

Il l'a confirmé lors du dernier sommet de l'OTAN à Bucarest, où il a rappelé l'engagement de la France dans l'Alliance atlantique, en tant membre fondateur et contributeur majeur aux opérations alliées.

- Cette rénovation des relations de la France avec l'OTAN va de pair avec une relance de l'Europe de la défense pendant notre présidence de l'UE : ce sont deux volets d'une même politique de défense. Le Président de la République l'a dit clairement: « il ne peut y avoir de progrès sur l'intégration de la France dans l'OTAN que s'il y a préalablement un progrès dans l'Europe de la défense. »

La reconnaissance du rôle de la PESD pour la sécurité européenne par le Président Bush et dans la déclaration du sommet de Bucarest constitue un développement majeur. Cela rejoint notre conviction que l'OTAN et l'UE, loin de s'opposer, sont complémentaires. Ce que nous voulons, c'est renforcer l'Europe de la défense et renforcer l'OTAN. Avec une Europe plus forte, nous aurons une Alliance elle aussi plus forte et plus crédible, où les Européens prendront toutes leurs responsabilités.

- Le sommet du 60<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de l'Alliance, à Strasbourg-Kehl, constitue l'horizon de notre démarche. La tenue de ce sommet sur la frontière franco-allemande, symbole de l'unité retrouvée de l'Europe, permettra de réaffirmer le sens de notre engagement au sein de l'Alliance et l'importance de la solidarité transatlantique./.





**CAPITOLUL II**  
**ESDP and NATO, Cooperation,**  
**complementarities and rivalry**



## L'OTAN - un partenaire solide pour une PESD renforcée

**Christophe Cornu\***

*NATO & Multilateral Affairs Section*

*Political Affairs Division*

*NATO International Secretariat*

Tous nos remerciements pour avoir invité un représentant de l'OTAN à l'occasion de cette Conférence particulièrement opportune pour une évaluation globale des relations OTAN-UE. Ce sujet constitue un paramètre pivot de l'architecture européenne de sécurité et de défense, et représente un enjeu très important pour la communauté euro-atlantique. **La coopération OTAN-UE est en pleine évolution, et elle va s'améliorer au fil du temps.** Par choix ou par nécessité, le terme « rivalité » mentionné dans le titre de cette table ronde et fréquemment utilisé par les journalistes, va devenir obsolète.

Premièrement, nos deux organisations se retrouvent de plus en plus souvent à **opérer dans les mêmes zones**, des Balkans à l'Asie méridionale, en passant par le Darfour ou bientôt au large des côtes somaliennes. La coopération est désormais incontournable et le défi est de trouver les bonnes modalités.

Deuxièmement, d'un point de vue transatlantique, une **PESD forte** s'avère de plus en plus nécessaire. D'ailleurs, lors du dernier sommet de l'OTAN à Bucarest, le Président Bush l'a clairement déclaré. Vis-à-vis des opérations et missions de la PESD, l'attitude américaine évolue beaucoup ; nous pourrions d'ailleurs constater à la fin de l'année 2008 une participation substantielle des Etats-Unis à la mission de police EULEX au Kosovo.

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\* Les vues exprimées dans ce texte ne représentent que des idées personnelles et n'engagent pas le Secrétariat International de l'OTAN.

Enfin, davantage de membres de l'UE admettent **la nécessité et l'intérêt d'une relation UE - OTAN plus étroite**. Ainsi, à Bucarest encore, le Président Sarkozy a clairement reconnu la complémentarité entre nos deux organisations - il a d'ailleurs pris l'initiative de faire en sorte que l'OTAN soit davantage représentée aux réunions de l'UE - et a dessiné l'évolution des futures relations entre la France et l'Alliance. L'OTAN et l'UE ne peuvent que tirer avantage d'une France confortablement installée au cœur même des deux organisations.

Les défis actuels des relations internationales et les évolutions nationales de certains pays (Etats-Unis, France, pays de l'UE dits « neutres », ...) ont des conséquences sur la coopération OTAN - UE. A cet égard, un certain nombre de **propositions concrètes** sont en cours d'examen et de négociation.

La première concerne les **consultations réciproques**. Si nos soldats et nos policiers sont confrontés à des dangers sur le terrain, nous devons nous réunir régulièrement pour leur offrir les orientations stratégiques bien coordonnées. C'est essentiel non seulement du point de vue **opérationnel**, mais aussi d'un point de vue **politique**, dans la mesure où nos **agendas tendent de plus en plus à se superposer**. Nos deux organisations jouent un rôle actif dans la stabilisation des Balkans, en s'ouvrant à de nouveaux membres dans cette région. Toutes deux élargissent leurs partenariats vers l'est, vers la Méditerranée et le Moyen-Orient. Toutes deux investissent un temps et une énergie considérables dans le développement d'un partenariat véritable avec la Russie. Toutes deux ont à cœur de répondre aux défis du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle que constituent notamment la sécurité énergétique, les cyberattaques, la lutte contre le terrorisme et la prolifération. Il est donc essentiel de mieux échanger pour mieux construire. Dans ce cadre, la proposition de la Présidence Française de l'UE d'établir un « **groupe informel de haut niveau** » est utile parce qu'elle réponds particulièrement bien aux contraintes opérationnelles et politiques auxquelles nous devons faire face.

Une autre possibilité de synergie existe. L'UE a entrepris un travail de revue de la mise en œuvre de sa « **Stratégie de sécurité** » de 2003. Dans les prochains mois, l'OTAN va réfléchir sur sa « **Déclaration sur la sécurité de l'Alliance** », qui sera l'un des éléments clés du sommet de

Strasbourg/Kehl, l'année prochaine. On pourrait imaginer que l'OTAN puisse utilement contribuer aux débats de l'UE et que l'UE prenne part à notre future processus de réflexion. Pour être véritablement **complémentaires**, les deux documents stratégiques doivent converger.

Cela dit, le défi le plus concret auquel nous sommes actuellement confrontés concerne les **capacités militaires**. Le niveau des dépenses de défense est une préoccupation pour nos deux organisations. Lors de la planification de son déploiement au Tchad, l'UE a été confrontée au problème de l'insuffisance du transport stratégique et du manque d'hélicoptères, comme cela a été le cas pour nous dans le cadre de la mission de la FIAS en Afghanistan. Nous devons donc cesser de dupliquer nos efforts en mettant en place un nombre limité de „**projets de capacités conjoints OTAN - UE**“, pour répondre à certains des besoins communs urgents.

Tout ceci conduit inévitablement à une autre réflexion concernant **l'avenir des arrangements dit de «Berlin Plus»** (mars 2003), en vertu desquels l'OTAN a offert de mettre à disposition ses moyens et capacités dans le cadre d'opérations que dirigerait l'UE.

«Berlin Plus» est né à une époque très différente d'aujourd'hui et dans un contexte particulier. Depuis, la PESD s'est développée et s'est notamment enrichie de missions civiles. Dorénavant nous opérons le plus souvent aux mêmes endroits, bien qu'avec des missions différentes (civiles et/ou militaires). Si cet arrangement reste une **option utile et adaptée, il ne doit pas constituer le seul cadre dans lequel inscrire nos relations**. Des possibilités nouvelles devraient être imaginées dans les cas où «Berlin Plus» n'offre pas un cadre approprié. Ainsi, suite aux demandes des Nations Unies<sup>2</sup> et des autorités somaliennes pour lutter contre la piraterie au large des côtes de Somalie, nous avons déjà engagé des consultations approfondies entre Secrétariats. En respectant l'autonomie de décision des deux organisations et le cadre agréé, les futures décisions dans ce domaine devraient ouvrir de nouvelles modalités de coopération.

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<sup>1</sup> « World Food Programme ».

Ces formes d'interaction vont s'inscrire dans le droit fil de ce que nous appelons à l'OTAN l'«**approche globale**»<sup>3</sup> de la gestion des crises, qui nous permet de mieux calibrer les instruments civils et militaires.

Le **programme de la présidence française de l'UE** dans d'autres domaines de la PESD contient également de nombreuses idées intéressantes. Ceci aura pour corollaire que les normes de nos deux organisations devront être compatibles et aussi exigeantes d'un côté que de l'autre. La mise en œuvre de ces propositions (réaction aux catastrophes naturelles, développement de nouveaux projets capacitaires structurants, consolidation des industries de défense de l'UE, libéralisation du marché européen des équipements de défense, ...) viendrait en synergie des travaux équivalents entrepris à l'OTAN.

Avant de conclure, la « **question de la participation** » mérite toute notre attention. La coopération OTAN - UE sera productive que si tous les membres de chaque organisation se sentent à l'aise avec cette relation. Nous devons donc trouver une solution pour que les pays de l'UE qui ne sont pas membres de l'OTAN puissent être associés étroitement aux activités de l'OTAN, en particulier dans les opérations. A l'inverse, les pays de l'OTAN qui ne sont pas membres de l'UE doivent pouvoir participer à la PESD au niveau approprié et avoir une place dans les organismes spécialisés soutenant la PESD (Agence Européenne de Défense notamment). Dans la mesure où ce n'est pas le cas actuellement, cette situation a des répercussions politiques majeures tant sur les activités internes de l'OTAN que sur la relation OTAN - UE. Les 21 pays membres des deux organisations ont une responsabilité particulière dans ce domaine et doivent œuvrer des deux côtés pour faciliter la résolution des difficultés.

A ce titre, l'initiative des pays nordiques de mars 2008 concernant une meilleure « **association des pays tiers aux opérations OTAN et UE** » est constructive et bien adaptée aux besoins croissants en matière de génération de forces pour les opérations. Une suite concrète devra y être donnée. Bien entendu, cela ne doit pas porter préjudice aux décisions qui seront prises ultérieurement concernant les nouvelles adhésions à l'UE, ni au règlement final des différends bilatéraux en suspens.

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<sup>3</sup> Voir dans ce domaine les décisions importantes du sommet de l'Alliance de Bucarest.

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Si toutes ces idées fournissent un cadre, il faut être bien conscient de la nécessité d'être deux pour mettre en œuvre toute décision en la matière. **L'OTAN doit constituer un partenaire solide pour une PESD renforcée.** A cet égard, le sommet du 60<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de l'OTAN, qui se tiendra à Strasbourg/Kehl en avril prochain, devra non seulement concrétiser une nouvelle relation entre la France et l'OTAN, mais devra aussi envoyer un message fort concernant le nécessaire développement de la coopération OTAN-UE.

## L'OTAN et l'Europe de la défense

**Nicole Taillefer**

*Premier conseiller, Ambassade de France en Roumanie  
Représentant de la Présidence Française*

### I. L'EUROPE DE LA DEFENSE

#### 1. Bref historique

*En moins de dix ans*, l'Union européenne s'est imposée comme un acteur *majeur* de la scène internationale. Elle a développé une vision stratégique, inscrite dans la stratégie européenne de sécurité adoptée en 2003. Elle s'est dotée des *structures et de mécanismes diplomatiques, politiques et militaires nécessaires* pour lancer et mener des opérations et missions extérieures de gestion des crises. Elle a conduit une vingtaine d'opérations civiles et militaires dans les Balkans, en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie.

Dans cette démarche européenne, la *France et l'Allemagne* ont mis en place les fondations: la brigade franco-allemande, puis le Corps européen. A Saint-Malo, la *France et le Royaume-Uni* ont poursuivi cette construction.

Les *principes fondamentaux* sur lesquels les Européens s'appuient pour leur action en faveur de la construction de la défense européenne ont été adoptés en *trois grandes étapes*:

- définition progressive d'une politique de défense commune (article 17 du traité sur l'UE, Maastricht 1992) ;
- capacité autonome de décision et d'action (conclusions du sommet de Nice, 2001) ;
- solidarité et sécurité communes pour identifier les risques de toute nature, y compris terroristes, et les moyens d'y faire face (traité de Lisbonne, 2007).



La *Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense* est devenue une réalité et s'affirme désormais comme l'une des politiques les plus dynamiques et les plus soutenues de la construction européenne.

## **2. La spécificité de la Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense**

### ***A. Contrairement à la plupart des politiques de l'Union, la PESD demeure de la compétence exclusive des Etats membres***

Domaines-phare de la souveraineté des Etats, les questions relatives à la sécurité extérieure et à la défense de l'Union européenne demeurent soumises à *l'approbation unanime* des Etats membres.

Ainsi, contrairement à la plupart des autres politiques de l'Union, la *Commission européenne ne dispose pas de pouvoir de proposition* en matière de Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. Les Etats membres sont les seuls à pouvoir impulser, adopter et contrôler les actions entreprises dans son cadre.

### ***B. Contrairement à l'OTAN, l'Union intervient sur tout le spectre de la gestion des crises***

La valeur ajoutée de l'Union européenne et de la PESD dans le dispositif international de gestion des crises repose sur son caractère tant civil que militaire. Les 20 opérations que l'UE a menées par le biais de la PESD recouvrent ainsi un *large spectre d'actions militaires, civiles et civilo-militaires* dans une logique de synergie sans comparaison avec les autres organisations internationales.

La PESD est ainsi la seule politique européenne et internationale qui permet à la communauté internationale d'intervenir *en continuité sur tout le spectre de la gestion d'une crise : urgence (militaire) – réhabilitation (civilo-militaire) – développement (civil)*. Le caractère unique de l'Union européenne réside dans sa capacité à mobiliser la *gamme complète des instruments de gestion de crises, militaires, humanitaires, économiques, financières et diplomatiques*.

### ***C. La neutralité de l'Union européenne garantit la légitimité de son action en faveur de la paix***

Ainsi que le rappelle la Stratégie européenne de sécurité adoptée en 2003, l'Union européenne plaide et agit pour et avec un multilatéralisme efficace. Respectueuse du droit international public, fondement de son action extérieure, elle inscrit ainsi, chaque fois que cela est possible, ses opérations et missions de gestion de crise dans le cadre d'une résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

Ce positionnement lui confère une légitimité supplémentaire et renforce sa neutralité. *Ce rôle de tierce partie est particulièrement important pour le règlement des conflits.*

### **3. Des opérations civiles et militaires au service de la paix et de la sécurité**

Les Conseils européens d'Helsinki en 1999 et de Nice en 2000 ont permis à l'Union européenne de conduire des opérations militaires selon *deux types de modalités.*

Un premier schéma dit de «*Berlin Plus*» permet à l'Union européenne de mener des opérations militaires en s'appuyant sur les capacités de commandement de l'OTAN (SHAPE).

Un deuxième schéma dit „*autonome*“ permet à l'UE de s'appuyer sur un des cinq états-majors nationaux de planification et de conduite des opérations mis à la disposition à cet effet par la France, le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la Grèce.

Depuis 2004, si SHAPE ou les états-majors opératifs nationaux (OHQ) sont indisponibles, l'UE dispose d'un *centre d'opérations*. Il n'a , à ce jour, cependant pas été activé.

En moins de cinq ans, cinq opérations militaires, quinze opérations civiles et civilo-militaires ont ainsi été lancées dans le cadre de la Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense ainsi que deux missions dans le cadre

de l'action extérieure de l'Union soutenue par la Commission. En voici quelques *exemples*:

### ***Balkans***

L'Union européenne s'est progressivement imposée comme un acteur majeur de la stabilisation des Balkans.

Elle a ainsi pris, dès 2003, pour sa 1<sup>ère</sup> opération militaire dans le cadre de la PESD, la relève de l'OTAN en *Macédoine* en lançant l'opération militaire EUFOR CONCORDIA à laquelle a succédé la mission européenne civile de police EUPOL PROXIMA, aujourd'hui achevée.

En *Bosnie*, l'Union a, une nouvelle fois, pris la relève de l'OTAN : l'opération militaire européenne EUFOR ALTHEA a ainsi succédé à la SFOR. Parallèlement, l'Union a déployé une mission de soutien à la police bosnienne (MPUE).

Au *Kosovo*, enfin, l'UE a déployé sa mission de police et d'Etat de droit (EULEX KOSOVO) *la plus importante à ce jour* (objectif de 3000 personnes, à terme).

### ***Caucase***

L'Union a conduit en *Géorgie* en 2005 une mission de soutien au système judiciaire géorgien (EUJUST THEMIS). Elle est aujourd'hui très impliquée dans la résolution de la crise russo-géorgienne et a déployé une mission d'observation (EUMM GEORGIE) de 350 personnes pour contrôler le respect de l'accord de paix conclu début septembre 2008.

### ***Moldavie***

Pour mémoire, ici tout le monde est bien conscient je suppose, l'Union a déployé en novembre 2005 une mission d'assistance sur la frontière moldavo-ukrainienne.

### ***Afrique***

Avec l'opération ARTEMIS lancée en 2003 en *République démocratique du Congo*, l'Union européenne a conduit sa première opération militaire autonome, hors de l'OTAN et à l'extérieur du continent européen. Depuis lors, l'Union a joué un rôle significatif dans la stabilisation de l'environnement sécuritaire en RDC : après l'opération

militaire ARTEMIS en soutien de la force de l'ONU déployée à l'est du pays, l'opération EUFOR RD Congo a contribué à sécuriser les élections générales de 2006. A l'issue de cette période, l'Union européenne a concentré son action sur le soutien à la réforme du secteur de sécurité congolais (EUSEC et EUPOL RDC).

L'Union est également très active en *Afrique de l'Est*. Pour la résolution du conflit soudanais elle participe aux négociations de paix et a soutenu la mission de l'Union Africaine AMIS. Une opération militaire de sécurisation des camps de réfugiés (EUFOR Tchad RCA) contribue aussi à stabiliser la situation à l'échelon régional.

### ***Proche-Orient***

Membre en tant que tel du Quartet, l'UE assure deux missions civiles de soutien à l'autorité Palestinienne (EUPOL COPPS dans le domaine de la police et EUBAM Rafah dans le domaine du contrôle des frontières).

### ***Asie***

L'UE a participé au règlement du conflit dans la région séparatiste d'Aceh en Indonésie par une mission de vérification AMM (Monitoring mission in Aceh). Elle conduit aussi une mission civile de police aux côtés de l'OTAN en *Afghanistan*.

## **4. Le développement des capacités opérationnelles de l'UE**

Que serait une Europe puissance politique qui n'aurait aucun moyen diplomatique et militaire de mettre en œuvre ses décisions politiques?

Dans un monde *dangereux et imprévisible*, nous avons un devoir de réalisme vis-à-vis de nos concitoyens : l'Europe, qui constitue un îlot de stabilité et de richesse, ne peut être la seule à négliger sa propre sécurité. Son *effort de défense* doit correspondre au potentiel économique et technologique qu'elle représente.

Or, nous sommes aujourd'hui loin du compte : si la PESD a acquis une crédibilité opérationnelle avec près de 20 opérations réalisées ou en cours, *l'effort de défense européen demeure insuffisant, dispersé - ou*

*déséquilibré* - entre nos pays, alors que les besoins sont croissants et que la contrainte budgétaire se fait de plus en plus lourdement sentir.

*Ce constat s'applique également à l'OTAN.* Les limites capacitaires auxquelles les Européens se heurtent pour les opérations de la PESD sont les mêmes que celles que nous rencontrons lorsque nous menons des opérations avec notre allié américain dans le cadre de l'OTAN ; le problème de l'insuffisance des capacités européennes est aussi un enjeu décisif pour la crédibilité de l'Alliance et la solidité du partenariat transatlantique. *Les Européens ne pourront être un vrai partenaire stratégique des Américains que s'ils s'en donnent davantage les moyens.* C'est là un constat largement partagé. Il faut maintenant en tirer les conclusions ensemble.

Ce qui m'amène à ma 2<sup>ème</sup> partie.

## II. RELATION UE/OTAN

### 1. L'Union et l'OTAN coopèrent étroitement pour la gestion de crises

L'Union peut faire appel aux moyens et capacités collectifs de l'OTAN dans le cadre du „partenariat stratégique dans la gestion des crises“ connu sous le nom de «arrangement de *Berlin plus*». Cet arrangement a été adopté en décembre 2002 et utilisé depuis à deux reprises dans le cadre des opérations EUFOR Concordia en ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine de mars à septembre 2003, et EUFOR Althéa en Bosnie-Herzégovine depuis décembre 2004.

A ce cadre s'est ajouté en décembre 2003 le document annexé aux conclusions du Conseil intitulé „*relation UE-OTAN, planification et opérations*“ qui avait été négocié entre la France, l'Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni pour mettre en place une cellule civile militaire capable de générer un centre d'opérations au sein de l'Etat Major de l'UE ainsi que des arrangements de liaison entre l'UE et l'OTAN. Une cellule permanente de

<sup>1</sup> Nato Permanent Liaison Team.

<sup>2</sup> EU Cell at SHAPE.

liaison de l'OTAN au sein de l'EMUE (NPLT<sup>1</sup>) et une cellule européenne à SHAPE (EUCS<sup>2</sup>), ayant pour objectif de favoriser la préparation de la planification des opérations militaires menées sous Berlin + ont été mises en place dans le cadre de ces arrangements.

Se présente enfin le cas où les deux organisations présentes sur le même théâtre d'opération (comme c'est le cas au Soudan, en Afghanistan et au Kosovo), organisent leur coopération par le biais *d'arrangements ad hoc*.

## **2. L'Union et l'OTAN se renforcent mutuellement pour le développement des capacités de défense des Etats membres**

Ce renforcement mutuel s'opère, dans le cadre d'un *groupe UE / OTAN sur les capacités* dont les travaux portent sur la cohérence entre les engagements, les objectifs et les priorités définis par chaque organisation (rénovation des hélicoptères européens, formation et entraînement de leurs pilotes, flottes multinationales de transport aérien par exemple), les aspects qualitatifs du développement des capacités (déployabilité, soutien, interopérabilité...), ainsi que la préparation des forces.

## **3. Renforcement du partenariat UE/ OTAN: propositions de la PFUE**

La liste des opérations que j'ai énumérées plus haut démontre, s'il en était besoin, *qu'il n'y a pas compétition, mais bien complémentarité, entre l'OTAN et l'Union*. Comme l'a dit le Président Sarkozy dès 2007 très clairement : *«Face à la multiplication des crises, il n'y a pas trop plein, mais bien déficit de capacités en Europe.»*

Ces progrès décisifs de l'Europe de la défense que nous appelons de nos vœux ne s'inscrivent absolument pas dans une compétition avec l'OTAN. Cette Alliance atlantique, faut-il le rappeler, *c'est la nôtre*: nous l'avons fondée, nous en sommes aujourd'hui un des principaux contributeurs. *Sur 26 membres, 21 sont membres de l'Union.*

*Opposer l'Union à l'Otan n'a aucun sens parce que nous avons besoin des deux.* Mieux : nous sommes convaincus qu'il est dans l'intérêt

bien compris des Etats-Unis que l'Union européenne rassemble ses forces, rationalise ses capacités, organise sa propre défense de façon indépendante. Nous devons progresser avec pragmatisme, et en même temps avec ambition, sans a priori idéologique, avec pour unique obsession notre sécurité. Les deux mouvements sont complémentaires.

C'est d'ailleurs bien le sens du message que le Président Bush a envoyé à l'Europe ici même au dernier Sommet de l'OTAN : des paroles très fortes de soutien à l'Europe de la défense, en appelant à une Europe forte face aux défis actuels, se dotant des capacités de défense nécessaires et contribuant à la sécurité et à la stabilité dans le monde

*Ce soutien à la PESD a été reflété sans ambiguïté par l'Alliance dans son ensemble dans la déclaration du sommet de Bucarest.*

C'est pour cela que la France a invité ses partenaires de l'Alliance et de l'Union européenne à venir réfléchir ensemble sur ce sujet, à Paris, dès le début de la Présidence française. Le constat général de ce séminaire UE/OTAN, marqué par le pragmatisme des discussions, a été que nos pays ont tout à gagner à favoriser la transparence et les synergies entre nos deux organisations. *Une spécialisation de l'OTAN sur le volet militaire et de l'UE sur les aspects civils n'est pas souhaitable*: il convient au contraire de développer les synergies civiles-militaires afin d'optimiser l'action internationale de stabilisation.

Nous ne méconnaissons naturellement pas les difficultés politiques qui s'attachent à la question des relations entre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN. Ces difficultés, nous devons essayer de les régler dans un cadre politique plus large. *Mais nous devons éviter de lier tous les sujets, au point d'interdire tout mouvement et de freiner le nécessaire progrès de la relation Union européenne-OTAN.*

Il en va de notre crédibilité, et aussi de la sécurité de nos personnels engagés sur le terrain.

Il faut au contraire, pragmatiquement, essayer d'identifier ensemble *des pistes pour progresser sur quelques mesures concrètes*, créatrices de confiance, et qui répondent aux préoccupations légitimes de chacun, en particulier celle de la Turquie et des Etats membres de l'Union non-alliés.

Comme l'a dit l'Ambassadeur Paul dans son discours d'introduction, le renforcement de la relation OTAN-Union européenne constitue une priorité de la Présidence française.

La France propose donc de rechercher une *mise en œuvre complète et un enrichissement des propositions françaises d'octobre 2007 pour l'amélioration de la coopération entre l'Union et l'OTAN et l'association des Alliés non-membres de l'Union à la PESD*; elle apportera son soutien entier aux initiatives qui pourront être proposée en ce sens, pour aider au déblocage des relations entre les deux organisations.

Elle propose également un nouveau schéma de coopération pour les situations où l'OTAN et l'Union sont engagées ensemble sur un même théâtre dans deux opérations parallèles, avec la *création d'un groupe informel de haut niveau avec le SG OTAN, le SG/HR de l'Union européenne avec le soutien approprié de la commission européenne, et du côté militaire, le SACEUR, le D-SACEUR et les commandants militaires ou civils des opérations de l'Union*.

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Permettez moi de conclure avec une dernière citation du Président Sarkozy ici même, à Bucarest: «Dans un contexte de multiplication des crises, l'UE et l'OTAN doivent aujourd'hui agir ensemble pour notre sécurité commune, en se renforçant mutuellement. *Ce n'est plus l'OTAN ou l'Europe de la défense, c'est l'OTAN et l'Europe de la défense.*»



## **NATO-EU cooperation in security research “Suicide Bombers: the psychological, religious and other imperatives”**

**Mary Sharpe**

*Senior Research fellow*

*Defence Academy of the United Kingdom*

*Consultant to NATO, Science for Peace programme*

The purpose of the intervention was to give a practical example of NATO-EU cooperation at the opposite end of the high policy level, ie grass root level and to focus on the soft power initiatives of the NATO Science for Peace programme on Human Societal Dynamics as opposed to the hard power ones of the traditional science programme and EC Council.

The NATO Science Programme gives grants for international workshops lasting 2-3 days to take place that allow experts from various fields to brainstorm and discuss new approaches to dealing with security issues. The conclusions of these workshops are first, sent to NATO HQ to feed into the Council’s deliberations and second, can form part of a book prepared by the co-directors for wider distribution, and third help develop networks of experts from a range of countries to develop new initiatives and encourage cooperation.

As a result of one such workshop designed and run by Mary Sharpe in 2004 on “Science and Society in the face of the new security threats” a clear message came back from the participants that there should be more cooperation between NATO and the EU at all levels and that there should be more time devoted to develop soft power initiatives that would help foster closer understanding of the needs of communities based on different cultural histories, value systems and aspirations.

However at that time the role of the two institutions, NATO and the EU was more divergent. Today as a result of more attacks within the EU and the development within the EC Commission of the directorate on

Justice Liberty and Security, which can support the initiatives of the EC Council in a more direct way, greater cooperation at this soft power end has started. It comes in the form of research funding, available directly in and across many Member States working in unison and bringing together diverse expertise.

As a result of a subsequent NATO advanced research workshop entitled “Suicide Bombers: the psychological, religious and other imperatives” in December 2006, several practical programmes have developed that are an expression of policy initiatives in practice and of how the international institutions can work together conjoining their different resources to produce a result that is a practical expression of the initiatives in action.

The workshop, following a policy of cross disciplinary and multi sector participation, saw a range of contributions from academics, military personnel, security and intelligence service operatives, political analysts and theologians including a practicing imam who had personally deradicalised violent extremists and young men already on the pathway to suicide bombing.

The will of several participants to work together to create new educational tools along with the support of the EC Commission and British government departments present meant that new initiatives could be funded and the usual cry of “something must done” could translate into practical programmes.

The first such programme is at the University of Cambridge within the Faculty of Divinity’s psychology and religion group to develop multi media materials for young people across the EU. The aim is to help them understand their concerns within a positive European- Muslim context, learn how to deal with the complexities of modern life in a culturally relevant and inclusive way and learn how to see the way they can contribute to its development rather than fight against it.

Further given the awareness of cultural differences and the privileged role of imams in an immigrant community, an innovative programme is

being established at the University of Cambridge's Institute for Continuing Education in partnership with the Faculty of Divinity. This credit-bearing course will educate British-trained imams recently graduated from Muslim seminaries in Britain in skills that will help them deal in a practical way with many of the political questions being put to them by young people and for which their training in traditional Islamic theology does not prepare them. It will also teach them about British culture in education including science, critical thinking analysis and pastoral care. It is hoped that imams from many countries will come to participate in this course over time.

By working at grass root level to inoculate the families and young people against the distorting messages of international Jihad it is hoped to be able to start disrupting the indoctrination via the internet to which so many young men and women are prone. By seeking to express themselves in a proactive and inclusive way, they may be better able to participate in western society and seek to reduce their grievances in a more acceptable democratic non violent way.

The seed funding from NATO for the workshop allowed for a wide range of experts and practitioners to meet and discuss issues in a professional way in the first place. The knowledge of and support to obtain the necessary funding by the EU for the actual development of educational programmes and materials discussed at the workshop has meant that the noble ideas and aspirations can, we hope, become a reality and a living testament to this cooperation which should gather momentum and stand as an example of practical leadership rather than remain as dead words and pious wishes in yet another conference report to sit on a shelf unactioned. Cooperation at all levels should continue.

## **Strengthening the effectiveness: The informal NATO-EU High Level Group**

**Daniel Ioniță**

*Director of the Security Policies Department  
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

It is both a great honor and a real pleasure to address some of my reflections to such a distinguished audience. The challenging topic of this Conference and the timing that our hosts have chosen for the debate could not have arrived in a better moment.

NATO and the ESDP are both involved in a process of evolution in the aftermath of the Bucharest 2008 NATO Summit. From the political point of view, for Romania, the 2008 Summit was a big achievement. It was a success built on important political decisions and among all of these, on what the Heads of State and Government stated regarding the NATO – EU relationship. In the minutes that follow, I will share with you some of my thoughts on the cooperation between NATO and the EU.

The international context is rapidly evolving. Therefore some of the aspects that are going to be discussed and debated today might lose, at the time of our future meeting, most of the interest and importance that we attach them now. But for those perennial issues that will continue to be on the international agenda, some of the ideas launched during our debate can prove to be of great importance once we will find the opportunity to transpose them into concrete actions. Therefore, today, more than ever, NATO-EU strong dialogue and cooperation is a must.

The topic of this Conference is of paramount interest for politicians, diplomats, experts and researchers. In a time marked by global terrorism and rogue states trying to get access to weapons of mass destruction, both NATO and ESDP are reshaping themselves, in a manner to adjust their conceptual and operational sizes to the complexity of their present and possible future engagements.

On one hand, after the Bucharest Summit and in the perspective of the anniversary in 2009, NATO is scrutinizing the current and future trends on the international arena, in order to promote its complex process of permanent transformation and to consolidate its position as the main defensive Alliance of the XXI-st century.

On the other hand, the French Presidency of the EU boosted the development of the ESDP and the reinforcement of the European defense capabilities. The member states are involved in an ongoing process concerning the update of the European Security Strategy, and to make it more tailored to the present international context and emerging threats. Among other security issues, I'm sure this 2008 European Security Strategy will also revise the NATO-EU relation. Moreover, this strategy should put more focus on the regions where the problems and to be linked with ENP.

The most important aspect of these transformations is that none of the two organizations conceive their new profile without a more deepened cooperation with the other one. As a matter of fact, „complementary“ is the key – word and the key - concept that assures the linkage between NATO and the EU. In Bucharest our Heads of State and Government clearly stated that NATO supports mutually reinforcing efforts to address the common challenges. At their own turn, especially Presidents Bush and Sarkozy reaffirmed in Bucharest that the roles of NATO and the EU are complementary.

Romania's vision, political positions and actions are also defined by its strategic location as a frontline of the Euro-Atlantic area. Romania has a natural transatlantic vocation, being an active ally that promotes freedom, democracy and prosperity. It is not a secret for everyone that our country stands ready to play an active role in consolidating the transatlantic link. Against this background, we believe that stronger European capabilities and a greater European role in global affairs will strengthen not only the EU, but also NATO's role as two mutually reinforcing organizations well prepared for the challenges and threats of the XXI-st century.

For this reason, the enhancement of the NATO-EU political dialogue, both in informal or official formats, is going to have as an immediate effect

a better and more coordinated assessment of regional and global security environments. As we all know, time is the essential factor for fulfilling the operational tasks of our two organizations. Constant consultations and cooperation on regular basis will allow the achievement of an appropriate and timely detection and prevention of potential crisis.

In this optic, we strongly support the initiative of the French EU presidency, regarding a high-level, informal, NATO-EU working group. This structure might allow both NATO and the EU, to better coordinate their actions in areas where the two organizations have common interests. The informal high level group will strengthen the effectiveness of both NATO and the EU. Inside this group there will be consultations on the evolutions of present operations and when confronted with crisis situations, the group will have exchanges of views, fundamental before launching new operations. Therefore, this high level working group might be the right forum in order to promote synergies and avoid incoherence.

Romania would definitely support a further development of the NATO-EU partnership, beyond the present cooperation related solely to military capabilities and crisis management. We consider that these two organizations have a lot more in common: there still is plenty of room for more strategic and multi-dimensional dialogue between NATO and the EU on the future of the Western Balkans, as well as on how to consolidate security, democracy in the Black Sea area.

After these brief remarks about the fostering of the NATO-EU cooperation and dialogue, I will now focus on the participation of both NATO and the EU to operations. First of all, most of the operations developed by these two organizations are conducted far away from the Euro-Atlantic area. This is a matter that shows everybody how irrelevant has become the geographical factor, when we bring to discussion the threats of our modern days.

Kosovo and Afghanistan are two very interesting cases in point, taking into account their dimensions, the complexity of means and the capabilities involved. These two challenges of global security have implied till now specific actions of the international community, under the concept of comprehensive approach, with the participation, cooperation and coordination of a wide range of civilian and military entities. This large –

scaled involvement has to be founded on the complementary actions of all actors involved and be able to avoid all unnecessary duplications.

In Afghanistan, the success of the international community does not depend only on the military victory in a traditional sense, but rather on succeeding in the creation of a secure environment. NATO alone does not have the civilian means to drive reconstruction forward. The EU does and for that reason it can, together with the other actors push the reconstruction forward, especially in training and mentoring the Afghan police.

In Kosovo, NATO is committed to ensure a safe and secure security environment of the region in the legal framework offered by the UN SCR 1244. Starting from this year on, the EU has decided also to acquire a greater role in the region. The complex tool represented by the comprehensive approach has been identified by NATO and the EU as the most appropriate manner to deal with the stabilization and reconstruction in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Its main characteristic is represented by a multi-focused action that successfully covers all fields that endanger stability in these two operational theatres. On these two operational theaters, where NATO and the EU act together, things are evolving in an appropriate manner, and from the conceptual point of view, complementary works perfectly in the benefit of the comprehensive approach.

Romania believes the planning phase represents the key element for the successful implementation of this revolutionary concept. The planning process for the deployment of new NATO and EU missions on present or future theaters has to involve from early stages all entities, with maximum of effectiveness, and all appropriate mechanisms for crisis response.

In order to fulfill Bucharest NATO Summit tasks we should consider new and enhanced mechanisms for NATO-EU cooperation that might be based on familiar principles and elements of the existing NATO-EU agreements. The existing useful agreed mechanisms should be taken forward and applied to the fullest. Together, as they stand in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and not separate, the two organizations can perform in the accomplishment of their missions, by complementary actions that will create the right synergy for success. Allow me to conclude, by underscoring that the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU has never been more important than it is today.

## **Germany - crucial factor and important beneficiary from NATO and EU existence**

**Ioan Mircea Pașcu**  
***Former Romanian MOD***  
***European MP***

My presentation will include several political issues, but I'll try to summarize the essence of politics, the mentality and expectations of a country like Romania.

From my point of view, we all are the „product“ of our geography and course of history. Therefore these are the basic issues that determine the attitude of Romania in this regard.

We have joined NATO for this organization presents the best guarantee of security for Romania as state and for the whole world. We have joined the EU for all the positive aspects within this organization and because EU is the other side of the coin, meaning the opportunity to anchor ourselves to the Western world.

EU appeared as an opportunity immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Romania managed to do what other countries of the ex Soviet block still want, meaning to join EU and NATO.

We want for the both organizations to be strong so we would not be forced to choose one of them as it happened in early 2000; I remember now the pressure that has been on Romania to express the first preference between NATO and the EU, but I hope this is a thing of the past and I would like to think that between the two organizations there is a relationship of complementarity.

For the time being, NATO ensures the collective security and has the means to do so, while the EU is restructuring itself in that direction. Therefore, the only answer is to integrate these two aspects of the two



organizations. And I personally think that this is the kind of thing we should strive for and I expect that the things will move in that direction. I don't want to see, let's say, a tendency in one organization to booster itself at the cost of the others. I understand very well what is the difference between NATO - which is the expression of a defense attitude, because we have to defend ourselves -, while the EU is the expression of promoting all of the other interests of the Member Countries. Therefore we think that these are exactly the basics of integrating the aspects regarding security within the two organizations.

Because I see here that I am mentioned as a "shadow report person" regarding the relationship between NATO and EU, I think that the revision of Berlin Plus Agreements is necessary and then we should consider a way out of this blockage which Turkey is putting between the two organizations; and I remember how frustrated I was to fly two hours from Bucharest, spent there half an hour just to be briefed about that the Ministers of Defense and the EU decided and then fly back for another two hours when I could have found out in more details from discussing with any other colleague of mine during a bilateral meeting, but we had to seen face, to preserve forms and all juridical things that are not very practical.

We should find a way in which we can associate countries like Turkey to the debates within the European Union and we should not make it a prisoner to the future status of Turkey within and outside the EU because we are talking about defense and defense is not divisible. In the same time we should try to see countries that are in the EU and would like to know more about NATO and equally be associated with the discussions.

We need also to talk about the energy security problems and the defense of the critical infrastructure. Is the EU structured to do that right now if something is needed tomorrow or not? Is NATO more prepared to do that?

We understand that Europe is depending on Russian energy and therefore we cannot say that NATO should ensure the security energy in relation with Russia, because Russia does not like NATO. I understand that very well, but at the same time we need some form of security energy and

decreasing or multiplying the sources of our supply and I hope that this is been done even if this fact is not made public.

And I would say that we also need to look at our resources because we have only one pole of resources-military resources, when we talk about all those rapid reaction forces. Professionally, we should look at and see perhaps lesser combinations but more effective and promising in terms of detenta and in case of need to be used.

Opportunities? Yes we have this possibility now that we have the first new security strategy of the EU which will be made public in December, but at the same time, I hope that we would be able to move also forward when we will received the green light from some member countries within NATO to move ahead with the strategic concept; and here is the key of integration of the aspects if we manage to relatively integrate the two major organizations which I personally think is not yet there.

And we have the Summit and I can only hope that Kehl which is much smaller than Strasburg is not a reflection of the fact that France is giving more attention to NATO than Germany in this respect, because Germany is a crucial factor in the functioning of the two organizations and had been the country which benefited the most from the existence of NATO and EU. We are counting on German support and equally on French support and on the fact that France is moving in parallel with the development of the European defense system.

## **NATO – ESDP complementarity - the solution for European security**

**Professor Sergiu Medar (PhD)**

*Former Romanian NSA*

*Romanian Presidency*

European diversity is more than obvious. Love and hate, intrigues and honesty, richness and poorness, security and insecurity, real democracy and “original” democracy, blamed Eastern Europe corruption and unblamed Western Europe corruption, New Europe and Old Europe, Europe with rroma people and Europe without rroma people, Christian religion and Islamism, oriental culture and occidental culture, all of them living together in a very small area with a very dense population and with an heterogeneity which do not accept to be introduce in a very strict frame.

What keeps Europeans together? The wish of its citizens for a prosperous life, which they cannot accept to share it with others and more than everything, a secure life.

Which should be the threats against European citizens security? I would not mention here terrorism as the main threat, not organized crime, not drugs traffic, not even political blackmail based on energy, applied by Russia. I should mention as the main threat the question “ESDP or NATO” or “a pro or an anti-American Europe”

These questions should drive at the European division and mostly at the division of the European States from their engagement to assure the security of the European citizen. This is a false question and this is mentioned more by European security enemies.

Georgian experience, and not only that, showed to everybody what it means NATO Enlargement or EU Enlargement. It is obvious that both enlargements means consolidated democracy enlargements. This is why these both enlargements bring not only security but at the same time the

acceleration of the democratic reforms and consolidation of the occidental type democracy and not of the “original” democracy.

I would see in Europe two types of enlargements: an enlargement from the west to the east and another one from east to west. From west to the east is the occidental type democracy under the aegis of NATO and EU Enlargement. Russia considers a threat to its security. Why Russia is scared by occidental type democracy?

From east to west is the enlargement of Russia’s zone of influence using, today, the energy pressure and may be tomorrow the financial pressure. Can Russia, in the near future, influence European countries financial policies too, not only energy and security policies? Maybe this worth being studied by the experts.

Today’s Kosovo, by far an unfinished business, and recent Georgian conflict proved that the rude, brutal, soviet style aggression did not disappear yet. The excellent cooperation between NATO and EU from Bosnia should be continued because this is the main factor to deter possible instabilities.

NATO – ESDP complementarity is, with certitude, the solution for European security. Current global security has today too many open chapters. Too many conflicts do not have yet stable peace solutions. It is more than obvious that a new approach is necessary. Any of this must start with this cooperation. To share tasks like “European security for Europeans and global security for NATO” could drive both securities to a disaster. National security of each European State will be built based on this already mentioned cooperation.

Acquisitions for military equipments, for every NATO member, must be based on building four capabilities:

- capability for every state to be able to defend by himself for a short period of time. From this point of view it is obvious why a concept “I do not need my sound own defense capability because, according with Art.5, NATO troops will defend my country” is a big mistake.

- capability to receive a projected NATO force to act together with national forces on your own territory. This is why it is necessary to have a NATO compatible infrastructure to be able to support national Forces to perform missions together with NATO forces. This is why building a critical infrastructure like highways, airports, harbors is at the end a security objective.
- Capability to operate with the NATO projected force on the own territory or airspace. In NATO, in air force operations, F16-th flies with F16-th, Gripen flies with Gripen, Eurofighter flies with Eurofighter. This is why, for example, if Romania will buy Gripen, the only NATO countries who could come to defend the Romanian sovereignty, independence or territorial integrity will be Czech Republic or Hungary as only NATO countries flying Gripen.

This is why the defense equipment acquisition decisions must be not only political decisions but a military strategy decision too.

Riga NATO Summit as well Bucharest NATO Summit took into attention the NATO security relevance with a very strong and credible military core. The proof of the NATO security relevance is that in both final statements of both summits were mentioned as NATO missions energy security with a special attention for critical energy infrastructure. I think this is an area where ESDP should be the driving factor, taking into account the big interest of European States on energy security in all its aspects.

At the end I would mentioned that all of us we must make all the efforts to find the complementary solutions for both security European organizations for a better and more secure Europe.



**CAPITOLUL III**  
**Perspectives of NATO and ESDP.**  
**SSR criteria and request**  
**for future EU countries**





## **ESDP and the Security Sector Reform in the East of EU**

**Mr. Rory Domm,**  
*Council of the European Union,*  
*General Secretariat*  
*Affaires extérieures et politico-militaires*  
*Transatlantic relations*

I think it is important to talk about the ESDP and Security Sector Reform, but also about the membership aspirations and perspectives for Georgia, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova. I am going to present some points of view from Brussels, focusing on some institutional aspects on the theory behind the ESDP and Security Sector Reform and what challenges we might face in the near future.

We must remember that the concept of ESDP is very new to us; it has come a long way since 1992 and since the first mission in Bosnia, in 2003 and now we have all kinds of missions that tackle this subject: in Afghanistan, the Balkans, so it had come a long way in a short period of time.

When we think about the Security Sector Reform, we must think at the source of financing the ESDP and at issues like lessons learnt which are something we don't do as well as we could. We must think about capabilities, not only military ones, but also civilian capabilities; for example, in some of our missions it was quite hard to find judges and prison officers. So there is a challenge there.

I know that the French Presidency has been very active in this matter. The think-tank community have not been incorporated into our agenda – civilian response core where we try to find the right number of people that should work in the Security Sector Reform.

There are some more strategic issues as well as the technical capabilities for ESDP to perform. The Security Sector Reform is very important and strategic element of the ESDP and it is true to say that in

December we are probably going to see something that is more like an update than a radical rewrite of the asset, but there has been a reason for that the doctrine had to take the test of a certain period of time.

Even in the crisis we see now in Georgia, you can see the fact that we have been more effective. Having said that, there is around some criticism that says that EU has a transnational approach that is focused on areas that perhaps are not above the interests of Member States, for example on organized crimes. So as far as European security strategy, perhaps we have to think at bringing in Member States more fully into this process, as integrating member states properly. Now, that is really what we see to be the problem with this document is that it does not talk about the bipolarity, multi polarity, about some important issues that are facing us at the moment and as I was indicating earlier, we are probably not going to get there just yet. That is something we probably need to think about, meaning cooperation with NATO.

I think it's worth spending a moment just to reflect on Lisbon Treaty. I mean we should be careful when we talk about this because Lisbon Treaty does not contain institutional reforms that will grow the European superpowers. The value of Lisbon is that it allows us to link our Security Sector Reform and the ESDP to be more effective. We can, if we have a high representative that work with the College of Commissions more effectively, to have a true civil-military cooperation. At the moment, we have the Council of civilians and militaries working together, but we don't integrate their developments in our operations.

Leaving aside this institutional points, what can we do? On one hand we have the Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan and on the other hand the Security Sector Reform mission in Bosnia. What is the difference between the two missions?

On one hand of course we have a country with very much of a European perspective and on the other hand we have a country that this is not the case at all. So when we think about the Security Sector Reform we must consider where are we going with it: are we going with this reform just for some objectives or is it a deeper sort of integration that we are looking for?

In the matter of the Eastern countries like Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Georgia, without prejudicing all of the discussions regarding their future membership of EU or NATO, it does seem to be a kind of interesting role-reversal among the organizations from these countries. In Balkans we have NATO, ESDP and OSCE missions, each of them plays its part in bringing these countries forward to the accepted standards.

In Brussels there is a saying that not all Caucasus countries are similar to the Balkan countries so we cannot apply the same method; some of the countries have not yet made up their minds about NATO or the EU.

I think that EU could play a crucial role in terms of Security Sector Reform and the ESDP in these countries. This is something that EU has not really come to think about it more deeply. EU is a soft power built with a form of hard guarantee behind it which is, at the end of the day, NATO. There is a geopolitical risk if EU does something slightly different for the Eastern countries, regarding this cooperation.

If we do have an ESDP and EU presence in that region we can get into some of the Security Sector Reform issues and EU is not yet the leader in these problems. We have some documents, but we do not see the EU talking the theoretical lead and why is that important? It is important because we have very strict criteria for countries who want to join the EU – the Copenhagen criteria and the aquis for democratic control of armed forces which is quite opened for interpretations.

So we do need to strengthen that criteria for the Eastern countries who want to join the EU. I would say that this is something we need to think about it along with the Caucasus conflict between “Europeanization” and “democratization”. This is something we saw in the Balkans region where we have some countries that need to fulfill a set of membership criteria and aquis communautaire and we have some security concerns (different from Copenhagen criteria) that we have developed on each country; for example police reform in Bosnia did not come from the EU, but from Bosnia itself and in Kosovo there were UN missions. And sometimes that approach could work but sometimes it could lead to complications and delays.

From my point of view, I would like to see these as democratic criteria for countries that want to move closer to the EU and of course it is going to be difficult. On the other hand, EU should think at working together with some of regional forums that wish to get more involved with the ESDP and to discuss with Brussels how can they do that and I think that the most obvious way is to participate in the ESDP missions; I think that „battle group” is a concept that could include not only the EU Member Countries.

## **A single transatlantic, democratic community, challenged by the same threats**

**Christopher Ellis**  
*Political Military Officer*  
*U.S. Embassy in Romania*

Thank you for the invitation. It is great to be here with so many friends and distinguished persons to discuss my views on NATO and the ESDP developments after the Bucharest Summit.

First let me state that the core issue to consider is the risks we face. In that regard it is always a great risk to invite an American to comment among so many Europeans. So, just to be clear, I want to say that I agree with everything everyone has said so far.

Secondly, I must confess that I am a rather lazy and selfish person. I do not like conflict; I much prefer to sit on a beach somewhere drinking something that has a little umbrella in it. For this reason it is important that the European Union has a strong ESDP, since the stronger it is, the more competent will be the EU's ability to manage a crisis. Once a crisis is transformed into a bureaucracy, the problems get assumed by imperatives that drive the bureaucracy. Strong bureaucracies allow me to be lazy and selfish, and sit on the beach without worries.

Some things are inevitable. If you follow the historical trends and see how NATO and the EU have evolved over the last generation, it is clear that these two organizations will continue to improve their interaction; to the point where one could imagine – perhaps not in our lifetime – the possibility of NATO and ESDP becoming completely integrated. Now THAT would be one formidable bureaucracy.

Meanwhile NATO's mission has not changed: the collective defense of its members. But the environment in which NATO conducts its mission has changed. NATO needed to adapt its instruments to face threats like

terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, and rogue states. To assure the security and defense of its members today, NATO must continue to adapt to the new security environment.

NATO has gone through a period of remarkable transformation to address this changing security environment. In 1995 NATO had 16 members, no partners, and had never conducted a military operation. Today, NATO has 26 members, over 20 partners in Europe and Eurasia, seven in North Africa in the Mediterranean Dialogue, four in the Persian Gulf through the Istanbul Initiative, others that are with us in Afghanistan, as well as global partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan.

NATO is conducting operations vigorously, is running the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, training in Iraq, leading the KFOR operation in Kosovo, has run operations in Bosnia and Macedonia in the past, helped transport African Union troops to deal with the crisis in Darfur, even delivered humanitarian relief in Pakistan after the earthquake. So NATO has taken on these broad operational roles to enhance the security of its members in very different ways than was the case during the Cold War.

So this is the transformation of NATO that we've seen over the past decades.

The Bucharest Summit was a furthering of this transformation process. We've seen invitations to new members — Albania and Croatia; and a commitment to Macedonia; we've seen enhancement of partnerships, and particularly with Ukraine and Georgia. NATO took an extraordinary commitment stating that Ukraine and Georgia will be members of NATO. It is not a question of “if,” but of “when.”

I have one observation stemming from an earlier question about MAP and Georgia: it is unfortunate that with all of the various internationally sanctioned consultation mechanisms available to address this crisis, none were seriously used to forego the military action. This shows a lack of confidence in these mechanisms, and that is unacceptable. We can and must do better than that.

Returning to the Bucharest Summit, NATO issued a statement on Afghanistan that articulated the Alliance's shared vision and long-term commitment to security, reconstruction, and development in Afghanistan. It outlined key pillars such as strengthening the military commitments, training the Afghan military and police, working more closely with those Afghan security forces, strengthening reconstruction and development, and tying that more closely as well so we have better coordination between the military and civilian components, fighting the narcotics problem in Afghanistan, and strengthening governance in Afghanistan. These are all parts of what NATO articulated as a strategy with the other members of ISAF at the Bucharest Summit. There are many other examples, as in Kosovo.

NATO also took an important decision on missile defense, recognizing a growing ballistic missile threat, and the contribution that the U.S. is making through its program to help protect Alliance territories and populations from these weapons. The North Atlantic Council is exploring how to add to the U.S. missile defense program in order to extend protection over all Alliance territory.

We reiterated our desire to work together with Russia to enhance security against stray missile threats, and we'd very much like to work together with Russia to protect against these threats.

When you think about the transformation of NATO that I described — enlargement, partnerships, the operational roles, the diversity of the operational roles, the geographic spread of the operational roles that NATO has taken on — then clearly there's a lot of capability development that needs to take place, has already taken place to some degree, but needs to continue.

I'll mention a few things that NATO has done but there's much more that's needed, and I'll come to some of the challenges in just a moment. I think a major challenge is to help European publics understand that the well-being, prosperity, political development and democracy that are

enjoyed within Europe are intimately linked to the investment and security in defense.

Prosperity and well-being are not sustainable without wise investment in security. Wise investment means identifying, developing, exploiting and adapting those resources, including soft (informational and organizational resources) and hard (infrastructural and material resources) to address efficiently both short and long term security threats.

First, we face a much more diverse nature of threats today when we talk about terrorism, proliferation, consequences of failed states. I think we need to sharpen our focus on what those threats are and how we respond to them and continue the investment.

A second element that I think is critical is the persistent reminder that our security is intrinsically linked; it depends upon transatlantic cooperation, coordination, communication and collaboration – there is no real, sustainable security success by going solo. It is still the United States, Canada, and Europe that together form a single transatlantic, democratic community; challenged by the same threats; sharing the same risks; in a world where we are only truly effective in addressing those challenges when we are addressing them together.

Though the two general challenges today are on how to reinforce the trans-Atlantic investment in security and partnership, the more specific challenges are in the implementation.

The European-based implementation tools in Europe for addressing the common risks and threats to European security are well-known. NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe each provide a wide-range of instruments to address risks and threats both across the broadest spectrum of political conflict and at different levels of application with varying degrees of impact.

Of these three, NATO and the European Union, collocated in Brussels, with overlapping – but not identical – memberships, have the structural and functional components most amenable for improving communication, coordination, collaboration and cooperation.



The ability to further integrate the systems that are responsible for peace, security, development, and prosperity throughout Europe is enhanced as the disparities in structural and functional compatibilities are diminished.

These systems for strengthening peace, security, development and prosperity throughout Europe – within which the fates of NATO and the EU are intrinsically bound – are in the interest of each organization’s member-states, and thus it becomes imperative that new linkages be created, and new forms will be shaped to address and enhance their respective political and organizational identities.

For this reason NATO and the EU need an ESDP that works; that is both effective for contributing capabilities for NATO operations where NATO is taking the lead; able to be used by the EU if NATO is not involved. History has its own imperatives for the future and we can only prepare ourselves as best we can to address the new, old and emerging threats to European Security.

The 3-Ds still apply: no duplication of what was done effectively under NATO, no decoupling from the U.S. and NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members such as Turkey.

What is missing are the links between NATO and the European Union to build within these parameters a strong and comprehensive network of security relations so that together, we members of a single transatlantic community, are capable and effective in addressing security threats, risks, and challenges both horizontally – those that cut across areas of competency and national or regional interests — and vertically – those that require improved communication, consultation, coordination, collaboration or cooperation between international instruments, governments, civil society, and individuals.

The six founding principles of the 2002 Joint NATO-EU statement included partnership (for example, crisis management activities should be „mutually reinforcing“), effective mutual consultation and cooperation, equality and due regard for “the decision-making autonomy and interests” of both EU and NATO, and “coherent and mutually reinforcing

development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations.” In institutional terms, the partnership is reflected in particular by the „Berlin plus agreement“ from March 2003 that allows the EU to use NATO structures, mechanisms and assets to carry out military operations if NATO declines to act. Furthermore an agreement has been signed on information sharing between the EU and NATO, and EU liaison cells are now in place at SHAPE and NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples.

A phrase which is often used to describe the relationship between the EU forces and NATO is „separable, but not separate.“ The same forces and capabilities will form the basis of both EU and NATO efforts, but portions can be allocated to the European Union if necessary. Concerning missions, the right of first refusal exists: only if NATO refuses to act, can the EU decide to do so.

But there can be no balance in the relationship unless European Union members commit themselves to closing the defense spending gap up to the NATO standard of 2 percent of GDP. I would encourage everyone to see that closing the 2 percent gap would contribute to a better NATO and a better ESDP. These are the choices to be made about the future of NATO and EU relations.

## **NATO-ESDP learning process: civilian crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction**

**Ștefan Tinca,**  
*General Director*  
*Romanian MFA*

One aspect revealed as lesson learnt after Romania joined NATO and EU is the lack of experience and institutionalisation of civil crisis management, in general, and participation in post-conflict reconstruction operations, in particular. This was due to the fact that Romania approached SSR mostly under NATO and NATO related requirements, and there was less emphasis on civilian aspects of crisis management, at that time.

Moreover, civilian crisis management is a relatively new topic on NATO and EU agendas as well, and Romania had to climb a steep learning curve in these aspects, simultaneously with starting to play her role we think it is appropriate within these organisations.

Post-conflict reconstruction is a reality still to be developed in a comprehensive concept. Nations and societies disrupted after violent conflicts are under the attention and action of the international community with the aim of facilitating swift recovery and development of societal instruments of governance.

Donor nations and international organisations had to take steps for rebuilding institutions and enabling governance in different parts of the world as the situation arises.

The main domains of conceptual interest are the reasons why a nation or an international organisation would embark on a post-conflict reconstruction operation, given the regional and global security environment, and the ways such a nation or international organisation

would plan and prepare for a reconstruction operation, in order to maximise its desired outcomes.

Planning and performing post-conflict reconstruction operations require specialised knowledge in various areas, such as public governance, security, economy and civil society.

As the experience from these operations is mounting and the lessons are being learnt, it is becoming obvious that one endeavour for success is providing appropriate training for civilian and military personnel involved in the reconstruction operations, and also in decision-making process and planning for these operations.

The concept of post-conflict reconstruction revolves around three main areas of specialised approach:

- how to build up and maintain a secure environment for the nation or society that experienced a destructive and disrupted conflict, and for the members of the reconstruction mission;
- how to develop and implement measures for building public institutions organising the social, political and economic life in that nation; and
- how to proceed on building appropriate capacities and implementing good governance principles as key elements of the reconstruction process.

The post-conflict reconstruction operations take place in complex and evolving security environments.

The main elements of such an environment include the type of political regimes; the stability/instability situation in the region, the country and the province; the level of local acceptance of post-conflict reconstruction mission; the crime and corruption rates; and others alike.

In order to plan for such an operation and to operate successfully in a complex security environment, decision-makers, planners and operatives should be able to understand the paths to stability, to operate with concepts of political authority and legitimacy, and to be familiar with key features of the relationship between central and local authorities, and the security sector components.

We had to address the institutional capability to understand the concepts associated with institution building, capacity building and enhancing good governance, as well as methods and techniques applied in measuring efficiency and effectiveness of public institutions, within the state and local governance in post-conflict societies.

Capacity building and good governance are main avenues of reconstructing a society affected by a past and recent conflict. They imply administrative reforms necessary for putting public institutions at work, and address significant aspects such as public accountability in economic governance, anti-corruption, role of local governance structures, and public participation in decision-making processes.

The decision-makers, planners and operatives involved in a post-conflict reconstruction mission should recognise the importance of these aspects and focus their endeavours at advising and encouraging central and local authorities in their efforts to build adequate capacities and enhance their governance.

What we did so far in Romania in these aspects:

- we recognised the importance of the topic, and identified the shortages at institution level;
- we convened an inter-agency Working Group at expert level on post-conflict reconstruction, that worked at preparing a course and an international conference as pre-steps to establish a post-conflict reconstruction centre in Romania;
- we interacted with EU Commission and European Group on Training on specifics of civilian crisis management;
- we held the pilot-course on post-conflict reconstruction with expected results.

For next year, we are contemplating to have the international conference on post-conflict reconstruction and to have three iterations of the course, in partnership with EU Commission.

## **The Security Sector Reform and the EU accession. A new space for the NATO-EU cooperation**

**Iulian Chifu**

*Director, CPCEW*

I would be as brief as possible in talking about these subjects. First one, we all discussed about NATO-EU relation, NATO-ESDP, what are we going to do about the defense and security of Europe which is our main concern. In this respect, we have the three “C”: convergence, consistency and complementary of both projects. This is a very important matter for the countries that are EU and NATO members at the same time. We cannot forget about the difficulties: we have talked a lot about the ways in which we can work together, that we did work together but we had some difficulties and we cannot escape from a discussion which should be made at the end of the day about Turkey’s, Greece’s and Cyprus’ role in this EU-NATO eternal debate on NATO-ESDP problems.

And maybe we can focus on the fact that Cyprus was the precedent where EU organization did not act in terms of supporting the conflict resolution. We all know that the UN peace plan was adopted by the Turkish side and rejected by the Greek side which was already granted the EU accession, and I think that we all have to accept that it was a mistake and we are still paying the cost of it, including by our existing relations between NATO and the ESDP, although the biggest part of the member countries are belonging to both organizations.

My second point goes on talking about the countries that are sitting between the NATO-EU and Russian border, especially Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. This fact did not happen by chance. There are the transit countries or the origin countries of some of our energy, European energy. These countries have different degrees of support for the EU accession or the EU projects, or the EU reform and reject, also at different degrees, the NATO accession. For instance, the Republic of Moldova talks about the fact that they don’t need the Security Sector Reform, they do not need even an army; they want to be eternally neutral

without any types of guarantees and this only because they don't want to enter NATO. For entering the European Union, they have to make some reforms in the markets, democracy, transparency and that's it. This is a wrong approach, because we all know since we don't make this Security Sector Reform, we risk that at all moment, all reforms that we have made on the markets, in democracy, in transition - if they will ever achieve their end-could be reverse over night, all of them.

The second discussion about these countries is the neutrality debate, where we have the official position of the Republic of Moldova and the position of some political parties from Ukraine. So regarding the neutrality, we have to tell those countries clearly, from EU's point of view, that you cannot go for European Union as long as you don't solve the two, let's say, most important provisions for entering the EU from the ESDP point of view: territorial defense and the contribution to the ESDP missions. And this means having an army, especially when you are at the border of EU and not in the centre, surrounded by NATO members and EU countries, but also this part of the Security Sector Reform is very much needed for the accession.

On the other hand, according to the Lisbon Treaty, we have the solidarity clause, but we also have the clauses that are saying that every EU member country should support the EU's external policies achieved through negotiations between EU countries. We all know how these policies are achieved, on the other hand we have the solidarity which means that all countries should react with all of their means in two particular cases: terrorism and civil emergencies. So this inacts the idea that we don't need the security sector reform for all these countries.

Moreover, we are all seeing those countries as future associated countries according to the new form of agreements that we are expecting to be made. We have the negotiations with Ukraine on the run, we have the reflection period for the EU mandate for negotiations with the Republic of Moldova and we have the assessment of the European Council on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September regarding Georgia. In this respect, if we want to move on with the Association Agreements, we have also to move on with the Security Sector Reform of those countries, either they want to go for NATO or not.

In this respect, we have I think three alternatives (I heard from Rory Domm that he has other ideas that are good to take in consideration, like the revision of democratic conditions like the Copenhagen criteria including the SSR): an agreement with NATO, SSR made by NATO itself, either by developing the needed capabilities of the EU - and I am not talking about some components of the SSR that we can see in the EU missions in Afghanistan and Bosnia Herzegovina.

In this third alternative choice, for sure we have a duplication. We already have NATO with the capabilities of supporting and leading Security Sector Reform so I don't think we have to go back in duplicating and producing a new capability for the EU.

And now, I am concluding with let's say a recommendation. I think that the Security Sector Reform is the first step for a future integration either in NATO or in the European Union for the future Associated Countries with the EU, and it should be the next step to be covered by the new Association Agreements, in the framework of synchronizing with the ESDP. And the second one, we have to pass a very strong word, all of us European countries, to our neighbors from the East, about the fact that the EU membership without a proper and complete Security Sector Reform is not possible.



## **Credible defense capabilities as a task for the European security and defense**

**Constantin Degeratu**

*State Counselor, Defense issues,  
Presidential Administration*

I wish to congratulate the people who worked very hard to organize this meeting. It is for sure very important and timely because NATO's Bucharest Summit was a very important event in the development of NATO and for sure for the cooperation between NATO and the European Union.

It is time for us to draw some conclusions about what happened since the Summit and in the same time, because next year will be a very important one for NATO and EU's future in the area of security defense and cooperation.

In the next year, it is necessary for NATO to have a new strategic concept and probably the NATO Summit will be tasked with this opportunity to develop a new strategic concept. At the same time, European Union is working hard to develop a new security strategy and probably those who are working in this area could give us a possible draft in a short period of time.

For a country like Romania it is also important because we will develop a new security strategy in a context when important countries like the United Kingdom, France and Germany already developed new strategic concepts in the security area.

What kind of future could we take in consideration, based on the experience which we already face this summer?

We have to take in consideration mainly the problem of our future, short, medium and long aspects of it. The questions which we cannot avoid are: are we witnessing a paradigm of change or not? The turbulences in the

international security area are symptoms, not steps, in the direction of the paradigm of change?

When I am speaking about a paradigm of change, I am taking in consideration what has been going on, starting with the events of 9/11 when something happened. And for that time it was an end of a dream that the American territorial security was out of the questions. At that time, the idea that America is out of the range of the security threat vanished. Then, it was another change, probably in 2003 and 2007, meaning the end of the dream about what kind of democracy is developing in Russia and that it might be different from what we have been expecting.

From 2004 to 2005, two other important turbulences appeared: one is regarding the energy security, our dependence and limits in that area, our capabilities and alliances and what kind of policies we could develop; the second turbulence is related to the financial market-economic security, who is now under question.

We think that there are some paradigm changes and crisis that we can manage. If we will not provide the right answer to these questions, it is difficult to see what kind of strategic concept NATO can have and what kind of security strategy EU can have. The problem is the OGC paradigm and the 2004 Oil-Gas strategy; the horizon for 2040 energy strategy when the energy will be in a total decline.

What happened in the last period of time allowed us to see that the dependence is creating difficulties at the level of both political and military decisions.

Our military operations are becoming more expensive; as a result we see actions like terrorism or others that are becoming cheaper. The problem is how to address this kind of actions. I wish that we could all think about this kind of questions.

The future of NATO is depending on our success in Afghanistan. This was a realistic target or not? This is a question that NATO Security Strategic Concept had to answer. Because I am sure that there is a solution

for a victory in this matter. The question is: were we realistic when we established such kind of task? The problem is if we are able to provide the necessary capabilities to accomplish our mission there?

What happened in the last six months seems to be not very enthusiastic in this direction. At the same time, it is necessary to have a clear image of what kind of solution are we looking for in Afghanistan.

The second aspect of the Bucharest Summit was the reach of the large range of objectives that we are looking for. There are more than twenty different objectives that NATO established for the future of the organization. The first was the victory in Afghanistan, the second was the involvement in a solution in Iraq; another one was the participation in Kosovo, which is still in discussion and provides difficulties, how consensus is build; another one is represented by the cooperation with the EU in Western Balkans, particularly in Bosnia Herzegovina; another one in the Black Sea Region, where there are tasks like stability in the area, nonproliferation and counterterrorism.

After the Bucharest Summit, other targets were established for NATO: one was the Mediterranean Dialogue, another one was the Darfur mission in Sudan and the enlargement in three different areas - one of the countries will probably be invited to join NATO in December, and I am talking about the Republic of Macedonia; the next problem of enlargement is Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia and the third one is the Black Sea Region, were we debate about the possible NATO future for Ukraine and Georgia. In December we must have an answer to this question.

What happened in this summer was a test for us, given by Russia, a test about NATO`s capabilities to accomplish its tasks.

Remembering that NATO membership based on PfP program is depending on NATO`s will and the nation`s will from the candidate countries and their capability to achieve the criteria necessary to join NATO. One of the criteria is to have no territorial disputes with neighbouring countries. For example, for Georgia it is hard to accomplish this criteria.

In this respect we have to talk about Article 5. We have to remember that Article 5 was invoked only one time, in the case of 9/11. But in the case of Russian aggression towards Georgia we must not think at Article 5, but at the PfP program, at the provisions of Article 4, that a country which is on the way to be aggressed or has this perception, it also has the right to ask NATO for consultations.

Nothing happened for a while when Georgia was aggressed. We faced the test of Russia to see how NATO is working and NATO did not prove to be working properly in the short time. For sure, we can talk about the aggression, because Article 5 is about unprovoked aggression, but it is a matter of debate, of perception, of decision of a country, consensus building on Article 5.

In the last 18 years, all the countries member of NATO, including the new ones, developed a new idea: how to respond to an asymmetric threat. We did a lot in this area, developing expedition forces capable to go anywhere in the world where it is necessary to look for terrorism or other threats, but also on other directions, including humanitarian aid or natural disasters.

As a result, it was a decrease of interest regarding territorial defense; there is no capability in that area. What we faced in case of Russia's aggression was a symmetric threat (tanks, guns, aircrafts). For sure, it was a challenge, but the territorial integrity of a state is not guaranteed by Article 4 in the area of PfP agreements. NATO can do so much as taking in consideration the political solutions to engage Russia in discussions; this is a task for NATO strategic concept for the next year.

A normal step for NATO is to increase the response force, of its troops in Afghanistan, or its participation in Iraq, or to support the transformation and the military reforms in that area, but this is not enough, in the area of paradigm. Because we usually try to be too conformists taken into consideration what we have been done so far, but we did not think about the real impact of the energy security and crisis, as well as what kind of capabilities we have to engage when all of our NATO countries are

depending on the energy provided by Russia, which is proven to be not so friendly sometimes.

On the other side, we have this financial crisis that came with some warning and we did not take them in consideration; this financial crisis came with the decreasing of military expenditures, so we are facing the fact that we will not be able to protect ourselves against a symmetrical threat; we can talk only at diplomatic level, at academic level about what we wish to see.

I focused my intervention on NATO, because NATO proved to have this large area of tasks which were assumed during the Bucharest Summit this year, but the majority have an important role regarding EU's security.

EU's profile as a security actor, frankly speaking, is not necessary very impressive. For sure, if we were to compare it with the one from 1980, 1992, or 1999 (the crisis) it is impressive in this sense, but if we compare it with the aspects from the near future, we cannot be too optimistic.

One aspect is the lack of clarity and strategic goals and targets for the European security efforts. In a democracy, every politician wants to attract votes when he says why we have to do something important (we can have an increasing of military expenditures, regarding the battle groups, when there is no strategic concept regarding their usefulness in the area of European security).

Every country that is NATO or EU member must focus on specific area to get public support; it is the public perception of a threat that is being diminished because people tend to think at their personal needs (jobs, way of living). What we have to do is to make up about the real threats and they have to be put out for public debates. There is no public debate on security of Europe.

I am sure that this conference is very important because it tries to put questions about ESDP in front of our governments. Public perception is sometimes more important than reality of the security environments. I

believe we must be less formal and more provocative in our debates, and in the area of the media, in the sense that security is an important problem.

We have only expedition forces, but no real capabilities to ensure territorial defense and there is the risk of aggression. Credible defense capabilities is not an absolute concept, it is a task for every responsible person.

**CAPITOLUL IV**  
**NATO and ESDP: view from the partners**  
**and aspirant countries. Open Debate.**





## **A „road map“ for Ukraine’s further Euro-Atlantic integration**

**Oleksiy MELNYK**  
*Razumkov Centre*

### **ESDP and/or NATO**

A discussion „The ESDP or NATO?“ has been taking place in Ukraine from time to time. Meanwhile, there is a better understanding that there should be no discussion about NATO-EU alternatives in the Ukrainian expert community.

The ESDP is actually a crisis management policy aimed at a conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Because of that, the ESDP can not be considered as a reliable alternative to the NATO security structure. At the same time, a development of the Ukraine-EU military and political cooperation is an important mechanism of the country’s integration into Europe.

According to the White Book 2007 „Defence Policy of Ukraine“ priority areas of cooperation with the EU are as follows:

- participation in ESDP;
- disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control;
- assistance and active participation of in EU-led peacekeeping operations as a part of multinational units.

For reference: In May 2007 the EU Combat Group Concept and decision-making procedure in the field of crisis management were discussed during Ukraine-EU committee work. In April during the 10th Permanent Ukrainian-Polish conference on European Integration of the concept of the Multinational Ukrainian-Polish-Slovak combat unit, Ukraine received an official invitation to join Multinational Military Police Battalion, together with such countries as Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Croatia (MNMPBAT).

The issue of European integration and cooperation is more popular in Ukraine than the Euro-Atlantic one. Ukraine's more active participation in the European security initiatives may enjoy broad public and political support. However, there is a significant limitation in the country's ability to do that. In the foreseen future our country should mostly rely on its own means – ie needs to maintain its national defence capabilities able to fulfil the entire spectrum of the respective tasks – and that is hardly possible under current circumstances.

Thinking about the best option of providing a sufficient level of national security as well as becoming more active in the European initiatives, we are forced to seek the full-fledged membership in NATO. Ukraine's principal challenges today remain very similar to those that the most of the EU and NATO members face. Some of the global threats have greater importance for the national security than others and should be addressed at the priority rate.

For instance, increasingly assertive Russian great-power policy; a decrease of the external security guaranties; risks of transforming the country into a buffer zone between two powerful international players, present greater risk for Ukrainian state. Serious internal problems of different nature aggravate the external challenges and undermine the state's ability to mitigate those risks effectively.

### **What can influence the country's ability to participate?**

Regarding the security sector reform, it may be stated, that a significant progress has been made over the course of the last decade. Armed Forces are seen by many as a driving engine of the Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration process. However, reforms in the entire State Security Sector have been poorly coordinated within different security structures and there is a growing gap between the significant substance and pace of Armed Forces' reforms on the one hand and the slower pace of Ukraine's overall advance toward NATO membership.

To summarise, while remaining its strategic course toward Euro-Atlantic membership, in the short term, Ukraine must respond to these risks within the current economic and political framework; that is, without relying on significant increases in funding and in a climate of continued political competition. The country must do that in an increasingly dangerous security environment, where global threats are now compounded by regional geopolitical competition, a weakened international legal regime, and the active exploitation of Ukraine's internal weaknesses by external forces.

Ukraine should deepen its partnership with both the EU and NATO. Strong international engagement and support will be essential for Ukraine's ability to meet this daunting challenge and to fulfill its international commitments.

**And finally, an issue of MAP**, which is also related to the place where we are now (NATO Bucharest summit).

Regarding the issue of Ukraine's invitation to join MAP, I would say that despite the very straight-forward official rhetoric, many Ukrainian experts and even West-oriented politicians agree that we should emphasize not as much on the question „When?“ but on the problem „How?“. Since that issue has become highly politicized in both internal and external environment, it could be advised to shift our efforts toward enhancing the substance of work under existing plans and cooperation formats with the purpose of reaching the qualitative level of MAP without unnecessary political confrontation.

Razumkov Centre on Oct 15 2008 hosted consultation „Toward a More Relevant and Coordinated National Security Policy“ with national and external experts through the NATO-Ukraine Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development. In a strategic assessment, prepared by the expert community it is suggested to develop a „road map“ for Ukraine's further Euro-Atlantic integration. This “road map” should include a framework for accurately assessing Ukraine's progress on a path of reaching Euro-Atlantic standards.

According to this goal it would be necessary to accurately define the present state of the country, as well as the goals that Ukraine should reach in accordance with all five sections of MAP. A further bilateral performance assessment of annual target plans could be carried out on the basis of the progress analysis in the „road map“ implementation.

**In conclusion**, Ukraine is and will be an active contributor to both NATO and the European security initiatives. This will require using limited resources, particularly human resources, in a focused and coordinated way to address its national critical vulnerabilities and to develop a necessary capabilities to fulfill its regional and international commitments.

## Republic of Moldova's policies in the framework of NATO and EU cooperation

**Viorel Ciubotaru**

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On February 22, 2005, the Cooperation Council EU-Moldova held its seventh meeting in Brussels. The Cooperation Council was the occasion for signature by the EU and Moldova of a formal document launching the implementation of the previously agreed European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan (AP). The EUMAP became a strategic document for the Republic of Moldova as one of the main provisions concerns the regional security: "Moldova is invited to enter into intensified political, **security**, economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. One of the key objectives of this action plan will be to further support a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict".

More, a similar AP was signed by EU with Ukraine and one of the most important provisions refers to "Develop possibilities for enhancing EU – Ukraine consultations on crisis management. Enhanced co-operation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation; enhanced co-operation in our common neighbourhood and regional security, in particular working towards a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict in Moldova, including addressing border issues".

Provided that the neighbouring countries implement successfully the priorities identified in actions plans, the signing of some „European Neighbourhood Agreements” was to be the next step in the process of approaching the EU. The neighbouring countries wait for these agreements to provide a clear possibility of a deeper commercial integration and wider participation in a series of community policies. Moldova expected to obtain such an agreement, but we consider that Moldova should be interested in the association as a first stage of plenary integration, rather than in the perpetuation or formalisation of the status of neighbour.

In compliance with the provisions of the EUMAP as well as with December 22, 2005 # 374-IV and January 16, 2006 # 414-IV presidential decrees, national commissions made up by high-ranking state officials are due to draft the national security concept and foreign policy concept of the Republic of Moldova by March 1, 2006. These documents were to replace the ones adopted 11 years ago through the May 5, 1995 # 445-XIII and February 8, 1995 # 368-XIII decisions of the Parliament.

One can ascertain after more than one decade that these concepts misestimated or ignored the true threats against the Republic of Moldova, establishing wrong priorities. The events in the past years imposed the reconsideration of threats capable to undermine the security of Moldova and the establishing of new objectives of the domestic and foreign policies.

The implementation of the EUMAP was certainly an effort to modernise Moldova. In spite of the estimation of the EUMAP implementation, this document is positive but insufficient. Under these conditions, the representatives of the Moldovan political class who signed the Declaration on political partnership for the implementation of the European integration objectives should continue reforming and modernising the society in order to reach the E.U. standards. The discrepancy between modernisation of Moldova and minimum E.U. standards imposes Moldovan political forces to make their agendas, focusing on the pressing need to remedy the handicaps rather than on doctrinaire subtleties.

There are more than two strategies in the Republic of Moldova that deal with the institutional renewal of the State institutions. These encompass national and internationally agreed documents with EU, NATO, UN, international financial institutions, and include national governmental plans, central administration reform programs, etc. It can be seen that the multitude of these plans could become an issue of concern when coming to their implementation. However, we will focus on the two of them, which have most impact over the current Moldovan foreign policy, as well as its society and on those with a concrete focus on the SSR – these are the EU-Republic of Moldova Action Plan and the IPAP.

The EU-Moldova Action Plan was negotiated in 2004 and is implemented from 2005 till 2008. The negotiation of the Action Plan happened before the IPAP idea was accepted by country's leadership. The lack of concrete SSR provisions in this document created the perception that the European Union did not have a clear security related agenda at that time, and, in case of Moldova, did not want to be more seriously involved in the conflict resolution that could have an impact on the SSR.

On the other hand the Moldovan authorities did not accept the idea to have an SSR at that time. The SSR was discussed within the civil society and officially only mentioned during the PfP Partnership And Review Process (PARP) meetings. Hence, the European Union was not suggested to play a role in the SSR. Consequently, the Action Plan has only general mentions about establishing new relations between Moldova and EU that, *inter alia*, will ensure more stability and security (see preamble). Moldova is invited to establish more intense political, security, economic and cultural ties with the EU, to intensify trans-border cooperation and share the responsibility for the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

The plan focuses quite seriously on the overall institutional reform, without entering in the SSR area. According to it, the Republic of Moldova will align itself with the UN, Council of Europe and the European legislation, including on the matter of human rights. It will also cooperate with the EU in the field of foreign and security policy, conflict prevention and crisis management. When speaking about the foreign and security policy it mainly focuses on the cooperation in the field of Transnistrian conflict, regional and international problems, including in the framework of the CoE and OSCE. The Plan mentions that Moldova will cooperate with EU to establish more efficient institutions and multilateral conventions, thus consolidating the global governance and will coordinate with EU how to deal with threats to security. As we can see the SSR is not a matter directly dealt by this plan.

One of the SSR related questions, which arise from this plan, is related to the fact whether the European Union is interested to deal with this matter. The 2006 General Report on the EU activities, in its Chapter V "Europe as a global partner", Section 4 "Contribution to the global

security”, gives an answer to this question – this section speaks about the European Security Strategy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. One of the points in this presentation is the “Security Sector Reform”. It informs the public that on 24 May 2006 the Commission adopted a communication “Reflections on the support by European Community to the SSR”, where it states that the Community supports the SSR in over 70 countries and in order to strengthen the contribution of the European Community to the global support offered by the Union, it is recommended to enhance this policy, to integrate the SSR into the strategic documents of each country and region and in the action plans, to set up actions specific to development of the SSR, in such a way that it receives an important role. This is a recommendation, which shows the importance given by the European institutions to the SSR in the countries with which it signed an Action Plan, such as Moldova.

This particular attention paid by the European Union to the matter of SSR can also explain the evolutions of the security related reforms in Moldova. Thus, although the EU was not directly involved in the SSR, it had the local knowledge, expertise and resources of another international organisation, with which it can cooperate in the field of SSR in Moldova. NATO has established contacts with Moldova as early as 1991 and included the country in framework of cooperation within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which later, in 1997, was transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as in the Partnership for Peace initiative launched in 1994. Already in 1995 the country becomes a member of the PARP process and starts regular defence evaluations.

Moldova’s relations with NATO are based on its neutrality status. However, this status bears serious responsibilities. A neutral country can not be a consumer of security – it should be a serious provider of it, since it does not have another security umbrella to ensure its protection from various threats. In these circumstances the discussions about the Moldovan defence reform, the drafting and approval of the “Concept of Military Reform” were additional indicators of the need to adapt the military to country’s needs. As it was mentioned above, the discussion meanwhile evolved from the defence reform to the security sector reform, since the need for an integrated approach to the security became more and more evident to the experts, particularly after the 9/11 and international security



events that followed, and that still have an impact over Moldova's security. The discussion about the security sector reform evolved as a natural evolution of the internal discussions on the defence reform, the need to ensure adequate security to the citizens, as well as the consultations with NATO on these topics, particularly within the PARP format.

The discussions on the SSR took into account NATO's initiative launched at 2002 Prague Summit to engage interested countries in an extended Action Plan that would deal with their concerns that mostly evolved around the Security Sector Reform. As it can be seen, this coincides with the year of the adoption of the "Concept of Military Reform" in Moldova. This also raises the question about the time needed for Moldovan authorities to evolve from the defence reform concept to a comprehensive security sector reform concept. As a result of political connotations such an evolution was possible in 2004-2006, when the idea to engage in an Individual Partnership Action Plan was accepted, and respectively when the IPAP was approved on 6 July 2006, although through a classified Governmental decision at first.

At the same time the 2004 discussions with NATO around the IPAP evolved in the direction of European integration priorities of Moldova. The NATO team that visited Moldova in 2004 suggested that the IPAP can be drafted in such a manner that it would support the strategic goal of the Republic of Moldova regarding the European integration. Understanding the EU and Moldova's priorities, the IPAP could become a complementary plan to the EU-RM Action Plan and reflect the EU priorities to make SSR an important plan of the strategic cooperation documents with the countries of EU interest. Undoubtedly, from European perspective such a SSR plan would be intrinsic to the idea of democratic institutional renewal of Moldova, in accordance with European standards, it would naturally complete, in a more detailed way, the EU-Moldova plan.

Therefore, the content of the IPAP was drafted to reflect the complexity of the relations with the European Union, and also to reflect the need for a comprehensive Security Sector Reform, in accordance to the European standards. It became a vast document that stipulates reform and actions in various domestic and foreign policy sectors, from legal, human rights and of public administration to the issues related to the reform of the military, paramilitary, and intelligence institutions.

## **NATO and ESDP: view from Georgia**

**Tengiz Pkhaladze**

*Chairman of the International Center  
for Geopolitical Studies (ICGS)*

The cooperation between EU and NATO is most interest for Georgia, as for the country, which wants to become a member of the Alliance and also wants to be integrated into the European Union.

Georgia is a country, part of which was occupied by another country and which has been punished for his choice to be free and democratic and for his desire to join community of democratic nations. I want to underline, August events in Georgia has long roots. Conflicts on our territory have been started 18 years ago, as soon as Georgia had made his choice to be independent country. And since then to the present day, during last 18 years Russia supports the separatist movement. Similar dangers have our friends - Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova.

During the last several years we have been warned by Russia, that the western orientation of Georgia towards European Union and NATO would have serious consequences and will not support resolve the conflict (it is easy to find these alerts in Russia's attorney's official statements and we all remember how Mr. Vladimir Putin regrets the collapse of the USSR). In other words, this means that Russia needs and would found other many reasons to created new provocations and conflicts and we could lose parts of our territory if did not stop our movement on the West. Therefore the main insecurity we face is the desire of one country to hold in hand another country by any means. The fact of such a punitive action and punishment is a serious challenge and a significant threat to the entire European security architecture.

European security is not only the security of EU members. It also includes the safety of neighbors and is an important part of world security. Therefore, it was noted in the NATO Bucharest summit declaration that „A stronger EU will further contribute to our common security“.

The security challenges we face, are multifaceted and interconnected. So we need international cooperative solutions that address the full size and depth of the issues. August events in Georgia show us clearly that the fundamental constituents of the international law, the territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, are indefensible and therefore stability of the region, as well as European stability and security, is put under a big question mark. This means that the world is changed and global security system needs reforms. EU and NATO must personate their unique role in this process. And their activity and efforts must fill up each other.

NATO remains the most effective international security Alliance. But it must continue to change, to ensure that it can play its part in addressing the full range of these complex security challenges.

As far as the EU is concern, it is important that it could be able to make its unique contribution, whether alongside NATO or on its own, including with armed forces when NATO is not engaged. The EU has the potential to draw together several strands of activity in support of a single policy: diplomatic, economic, development, police and rule of law, and now military. Its potential is enormous but it delivers less than the sum of its parts.

Both NATO and the EU have developed processes that help nations identify their requirements and ways in which they might be met in order for a fruitful cooperation and even a road towards integration. Both need to be ready to rise to the challenges we face, by accepting the responsibility to contribute where they can make a difference.

Both have expanded to include formerly Communist countries, and almost all those countries who are not yet in NATO and the EU, have been offered membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace, or are part of the EU's pre-accession programmes.

Georgia actively cooperate with NATO and EU on democratic, institutional, and defense reforms, and have developed practical cooperation in many other areas.

We are grateful to the EU for a cease-fire agreement, but we also want to see conflict resolution as the result of these activities, not their further freeze. Today we see that ESDP mission is not given the opportunity to enter directly into the conflict zone and to monitor it. Unfortunately this is not the only example how peaceful initiative has been blocked and the international agreements approximate in terms of „fist low“, according to the principle „everybody loves a winner.“

The stakes in the Southern Caucasus region are significant. Georgia forms a gateway linking the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and is vital for the control of Central Asia’s massive fossil resources, and for the well-known Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines. Georgia’s geographic position is also critical to NATO’s ability to secure the Black Sea region.

For the development of Georgia the prospects of European Neighborhood Policy in the Southern Caucasus and implementation of the EU-Georgia Action Plan are issues of key importance, as well as enter in NATO’s Membership Action Plan. Increased ties between the Georgia and the EU can also be expected, although membership is still far away if ever.

Our pathway and choice dictated by a desire to be free, independent and at the same time secure. We are aiming at the Euro-Atlantic structures because there we could find our peaceful and democratic development. Georgia is part of European civilization and it should not suffer for his choice to be a European country.

Therefore it is very important to further enhance and raise our cooperation not only at the official level, but also at the expert level. We should permanently exchange our views and discussion on future risks and challenges. And this cooperation makes us more secure end capable to respond to this challenges.

## **The indivisibility of security in Europe: view from Azerbaijan**

**Mr. Anar Jahangirli**

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*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan*

It is noteworthy that, for the discussions on the ESDP and NATO relations, the views from partner nations are also taken in consideration. This demonstrates our common interest in the indivisibility of security in Europe and understanding that engagement of partners has an added value.

European Security and Defence Policy, is not an old instrument. With the ESDI project of NATO, transferred smoothly, if I may say so, to ESDP we witnessed the first attempt in trying to build the gap between the structural and functional discrepancies.

At the time of the entrance into force of the Maastricht treaty, both EU and the NATO were busy with self-restructuring and enlargements, and neither of them was fully engaged in shaping common defense perspectives for Europe.

Azerbaijan, as a country that had joined to the PfP in 1994, did not have any vested interest in contributing to this process at the time. Nation-building and partial recovery from the occupation of its lands, were the major preoccupations. However, with developed our partnership with NATO, with the introduction of new partnership instruments and programs, my country got engaged more closely in shaping the thinking on a robust security architecture for Europe.

Whereas the security is an old concept with new approaches, so it would be in the best interest of all parties to establish a new NATO-ESDP relationship capable of handling complicated issues like terrorism and energy dependence, while maintaining the health of the transatlantic financial and trade relations.

We think that, the structural similarities between NATO and ESDP should be avoided. For partners, I think it would be more important to see the new trends in further developing the partnership. When invented, the partnership was deemed as a bridge to the eventual membership in both the NATO and the EU. However, the history shows that the happy-end is not always the way things happen.

This has multi-layer shortcomings. I think that, unjustified expectations could eventually lead to overestimation of perceptions and frustration. Of course, there are success stories too. But every region is unique and “one size fits all approach” cannot be applied.

When we see that membership is not feasible, because of irritation, there should be looked for other ways. Then situation and institutional framework of partnership becomes inadequate. Crisis in Georgia demonstrated that partner nations should be more involved in NATO. Other question, which arose, was the SSR, how effectively we implement those reforms. In Azerbaijan, we attach a great importance to SSR.

The doors of NATO should always be kept open for partners. New options should be developed providing security guarantees/legal harmony, providing political unanimity, and providing practical interoperability.

Such a framework, developed based on these 3 pillars, should contribute to the indivisibility of security in Europe and contribute to the development of a new quality relationship, leading to more open doors for partners.

It was mentioned here that the countries in Caucasus have not made up their mind for NATO and that is why it is better to bring them closer to the EU programs. Paradoxically, I have to say, it has always been easier to work and cooperate with NATO as a whole, than with the EU as an organization. And from my part, I can say that, being more and more involved in NATO and its activities, will eventually lead to convergences of positions and more integration.

On the EU part, apart from the economic assistance in mid 1990s, due to objective reasons of course, the countries of Caucasus could not advance the relations to more than having the partnership and cooperation agreement, without a light at the end of tunnel. Even the ENP did not include Caucasian countries at its initial draft and launching. Complex decision-making formulas and the lack of perspectives for partners in the EU, contrary to the NATO formats, was a discouraging factor. Today Azerbaijan does not participate in any ESDP operations. On the other hand, we contributed to operation in Kosovo (pulled out in 2008) and we are still continuing to participate to the operation in Afghanistan.

With this background, it is important to mention a new Eastern Partnership initiative, which is obviously more promising and with more clear objectives. In this partnership, we know we get at the end of process. This initiative also gave a right message in terms of reference to our part of the world as Eastern Europe, rather than European neighborhood.

In conclusion, I would like to mention one thing that, we have to perceive the security as a process, rather than a permanent state of affairs.

## **National Security of the Republic of Moldova – the role of EU**

**Oazu Nantoi**

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Republic of Moldova is facing multiple threats to its national security. It is enough to mention that on its territory illegal troops of the Russian Federation are stationed, following the conflict in 1992 the state has lost control over a number of localities on the left bank (Transnistria) and the city of Bender (right bank). Republic of Moldova is extremely vulnerable in terms of energy security, and in 2006 it was forced to bear the economic embargo of the Russian Federation. At the same time, unlike the Baltic States, after achieving independence in 1991, the Republic of Moldova has not been able to formulate and carry out an effective policy regarding ensuring national security. As a result, in December 1991, Moldova signed the Agreement on Accession to CIS.

Besides that, in Moldovan society no public discussions regarding the accession of the Republic to NATO have taken place. Instead, on July 29 1994, the Moldovan Parliament adopted a Constitution that contains the clause stating permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova. Article 11 of the Constitution provides that (1) *The Republic of Moldova proclaims her permanent neutrality*, and that (2) *The Republic of Moldova will not admit the stationing of any foreign military troops on its territory*. The Constitution stipulates, as well, that the status of permanent neutrality can be changed only by referendum.

The time that passed proved that the status of permanent neutrality has not solved any of the problems regarding the national security of the Republic of Moldova. The Russian Federation, which holds the status of mediator in the process of negotiations in Transnistria, in a brutal manner, defies the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova and the status of its permanent neutrality. Russian Federation, ignoring its commitments



undertaken at the OSCE Summit in November 1999 in Istanbul, refuses to evacuate its military potential from the territory of Moldova.

In November 2003 the national security of the Republic of Moldova faced a serious test. As a result of the incompetent leadership of Moldova, the Russian Federation has tried to impose the signing of a document, later named “Kozak Memorandum<sup>1</sup>”. This document, if signed, provided the transformation of the Republic of Moldova in a new unviable pseudo-state, controlled by the Russian Federation, guaranteeing Russian military presence for at least 20 years. Kozak Memorandum was developed in secret, without the participation of the society of the Republic of Moldova, without it being informed as well as without informing the other participants in the process of negotiations (OSCE and Ukraine), as well as the EU and the U.S. Only because of extremely energetic intervention from the U.S., EU and OSCE, the signing of this document has been avoided.

EU enlargement and the inclusion of the Republic of Moldova in the ENP have created a new geopolitical situation. These changes were manifested in the signing on February 22 2005, of the EU – Republic of Moldova Action Plan and by obtaining for the EU, together with the U.S.- following the consultations in Odessa on September 25-26 2005 - the status of observer in the process of negotiation on Transnistrian conflict.

The concern of the EU in Transnistrian conflict began to unfold since 2003, when on February 27-th, the EU introduced a travel ban for a group of representatives of the Tiraspol administration. Also, in 2003 EU has become an effective mediator between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova regarding the transparency of the Transnistrian segment (452 km.) of the bilateral border. The problem of the effective control of this segment of the border had been raised both in the EU-Republic of Moldova Action Plan and in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.

EUBAM mission, the work of which began in March 2006, has dramatically changed the atmosphere around the Transnistrian problem.

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<sup>1</sup> Dmitrii Kozak – Special Representative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, empowered to mediate between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

Despite the extremely negative reaction of the Kremlin and the local government in Transnistria and staged „protest actions“, the EU has not ceded. As a result, all economic enterprises in the Transnistrian region were registered in Chisinau and started working in the legal framework formulated by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

The armed conflict in Georgia, in August 2008, raised a series of questions regarding the possible scenarios of the evolution of the situation around the Transnistrian problem. It can be supposed that this state of uncertainty has facilitated the adoption by the EU on October 13, 2008 in Luxembourg, of the Conclusions on the Republic of Moldova. These conclusions, taken at the meeting of the Council of General Affairs and External Relations of the EU (CAGRE), contain a positive message, addressed to the Republic of Moldova, in which the EU promised “to negotiate a new and ambitious agreement with Moldova soon”.

At the same time, the Conclusions of October 13, 2008 contain provisions addressing the situation around the Transnistrian issue: “The EU will increase its engagement in efforts to resolve the conflict in Transnistria and reaffirms its attachment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. The Council would recall that the “5 + 2” negotiating format is the only guarantee of the transparency and legitimacy needed to find a lasting solution. It calls on all the parties concerned to resume negotiations in the „5 + 2“ format. It encourages the parties to the conflict to work together on confidence-building measures and stresses the contribution made by assistance from the Community and the Member States in supporting and facilitating this process.”

These provisions, particularly the references to the 5 +2 negotiations format, are a protection tool for the Republic of Moldova against any eventual pressure from the Russian Federation. Their importance is determined by the fact that the President of the Republic of Moldova, since 2006, returned to the policy of solving the conflict on the basis of an “package deal” with the Kremlin administration. As a result of this blundered policy, the EU and U.S. have remained outside the process of negotiations and the danger that Russia will force Chisinau to sign any document similar to the Kozak Memorandum came out.

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The conclusion resulting from the above statements is that the EU has become the only real instrument for the Republic of Moldova of ensuring national security, particularly in regard to the protection against Russian Federation policy, promoted through the regime of Transnistrian region. Meanwhile, the EU is consistent in promoting the strengthening of the rule of law and political democracy in the Republic of Moldova. When this policy would lead to tangible changes, it is possible that the society of the Republic of Moldova would want to address properly the issue of the national security, including reviewing the prospect of the relations of the country with NATO.



# **CAPITOLUL V**

## **Conclusions**



## Conclusions

**Prof. dr. Cornel Codită**  
*Program director, CPCEW*

Let me first start with a few thoughts that had not been totally expressed here, but I think they are with us and are having a huge impact on the way we are looking and trying to solve the problem related to the cooperation between NATO and the European Union.

First of all, the idea that Europe is by many accounts becoming a smaller place in terms of geopolitical considerations; like it or not, the centre of the EU is moving; it has moved towards the West after the second World War. The second saying is that Europe is pretty rich first of all in history, based on state policy-meaning rivalry and competition. For the last 15 years, we did not have conflicts but rather rivalries and competition, politics and policies are made in Europe and we took this “heritage” to 21<sup>st</sup> century with us.

The second richness of Europe is institution building experience. By my knowledge, Europe is perhaps the most crowded place on Earth in terms of institutions. Now the problem is that more and more problems of Europe are still outside the consideration, of a proper solution provided by those institutions. So what we are saying is more and more of Europe’s problem is staying aside and not be introduce into the machinery of those institutions.

The striking think for us is that Europe is still rich in a strange and dramatically sense of insecurity; as compared to any other place on Earth, we are still the continent where the security related problems are so high on the agenda and this is the syndrome of insecurity in Europe; and also, the politicians are making their decisions based on this syndrome which does not correspond much to our reality.

The next thing I want to discuss is that unfortunately, Europe has some “heritage” when it comes to delay a critical decision about itself and

acting upon a decision already made. And finally, in an optimistic note, I would say this is probably the best time in the last 20 years, for Europe to develop a more fruitful relation among its institutions.

Now, with the preliminary remarks of mine, I will go to the ideas which have been expressed here in forms of questions:

First of all, who should take the lead in forcing cooperation between NATO and European Union? The panelists discussions provided us the classic answer of “egg and chicken”; either the state should take the lead or the institutions themselves? I think that there is no good answer to this question.

No cooperation can be improved unless the states make up their minds about what they want out of that cooperation. On the other hand, the state will not reach the good solution unless an expertise valid both my NATO and EU is helping the decision-makers back home to understand how this huge institutions are working. So, so much for who should take the lead.

***The second question is why should they cooperate?***

Our discussion here provided us with many answers to this question and I will refer very briefly to some of them: Christophe Conu said that cooperation is needed first of all because there is a convergence in politics, in economics, in military strategic problems and this is the natural thing to happen. Also, some of the other panelists have brought into the fact that there are a number of essential conditions, challenges and possibilities which are now opened and making the area of cooperation larger than ever. Also, for example, Nicole Taillefer was saying to us that the cooperation is the natural outcome of the institution building and certainly what NATO is doing in its transformation looks like is providing a large area for cooperation. Why should they cooperate was clearly pointed out by Dragoş Ghercioiu who told us quite clearly that good results are a good reason for enlarging the cooperation; and we have good results in critical areas and that is a good basis to move forward.



Now, the third question is why do we want to enhance cooperation, what is our purpose and the meaning of it?

And the panelists have answered by giving five answers to this: first of all cooperation is needed to meet the needs of a new security paradigm and this was presented according to the international environment by general DeGroot; the second answer which was given here is that we need to enhance cooperation because we need to reinforce the trans-Atlantic link, the third answer to the question is crisis management and the purpose of this collaboration is that NATO and EU will become more valuable to the Europeans. It was recognized that institutions in Europe have a sort of deficit of credibility with their citizens and therefore enhancing cooperation will move these into a more credible area. Another answer was that there is a specific agenda which could be covered only if cooperation between NATO and EU will be developed further.

***Next question is what means to we have to get a better cooperation between NATO and ESDP?***

There have been a number of indications here, answering this question. First of all we have a lot of political means specially in political thinking and in political action; there are economic means at our disposal and it was said here that we do not need to duplicate our capability, we need to use our resources to make both institutions more effective and there are several organization reason for this cooperation because one better serves its interests by cooperating with the other. By this cooperation, Europe is brought closer to its dreams and purposes.

So this is not only an exercise in proving the institutions or an exercise to do more effective policy, this is an exercise in making Europe more able to achieve its own growth and those who are covering both NATO and EU objectives.

Keeping alive the Euro-Atlantic strategic partnership could provide a better security in many ways, not only military, but in different other ways (economic area) and that cannot be done separately from the two organizations.

NATO and the EU is what I would call a “promised marriage”; now the problem with any marriage is the way decisions are made inside the couple. I think this is also the problem here: how and who takes the big decisions, and who takes the little/small decision. But any way, the marriage is here to resist, if a suitable decision making system is established a shared complementary mechanism of the decision is put in place, respecting the independent existence of both organizations.

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#### **Conclusions**

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